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Abstract 
Colleges and universities discount tuition by providing institutional aid to reduce 
the actual amount paid by a student. Discount rates are substantial and continue to 
increase, particularly at private institutions. Funded institutional discounts are linked to 
gifts or endowment income restricted to financial aid. Unfunded institutional discounts 
have no revenue source and represent tuition revenue foregone to incentivize enrollment. 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the implications of tuition discounting 
on institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at 
private baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. Price elasticity, the change in quantity 
demanded based on change in price, proved highly volatile and varied greatly among the 
sample and within institutions over time. Analyses found no statistically significant 
relationship of price elasticity for either full-pay or aided students with unfunded 
institutional discounting. Admissions selectivity was a significant predictor of unfunded 
institutional discounting with less selective institutions discounting more through 
unfunded aid. The most selective colleges also discounted to fewer students, whereas the 
bottom three quartiles aided more than 96% of enrolling students in 2009. These fmdings 
supported the conclusion that colleges awarding higher levels of unfunded aid have less 
market strength. 
Analyses also found no significant changes in the ratio of funded and unfunded 
institutional discounting as a result of the economic recession, though unfunded 
institutional discounting did increase from 27.3% to 32.3% from 2000 to 2009. 
Jeremy Paul Martin 
Educational Policy, Planning, and Leadership Program, School of Education 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia 
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TUITION DISCOUNTING THROUGH UNFUNDED INSTITUTIONAL AID 
AT PRIVATE BACCALAUREATE COLLEGES 
Chapter One: The Problem and Its Context 
Tuition discounting, providing institutional aid to reduce a student's tuition cost, 
is a nearly universal practice in higher education (Davis, 2003; Lapovsky, 1999; 
McPherson & Shapiro, 1995). Long established in financial aid policies, discount rates 
are now substantial and continue to increase, particularly at private colleges and 
universities. These private institutions discounted tuition to undergraduates by 3 7.1% in 
2010, up from 33.6% a decade earlier and more than double the rate of their public peers 
(Almanac of Higher Education, 2011; Baum, Lapovsky, & Ma, 2010). In effect, this 
means the average student paid only $0.63 of every dollar in the published tuition rate. 
On one hand, this helps make a college more affordable to aided students. On the other 
hand, this means institutions collected only $0.63 of every dollar of possible tuition 
revenue, limiting the total institutional funds available for operations. The tension 
between providing institutional aid and maintaining the financial health of an institution 
demands constant attention. 
Tuition Discounting: Background, and Context 
The use of institutional aid to discount tuition dates to the very origin of American 
higher education. In 1643, Lady Ann Radcliffe Mowlson donated £100 to Harvard 
College for the "maintenance of some poor scholler [sic]" (Harvard University, 1948, p. 
135). Lady Mowlson's gift created the first endowed scholarship in America. As early 
as the turn of the 19th century, colleges began providing a different form of institutional 
aid. Thirty-three of the 39 graduates in Dartmouth College's class of 1806 owed money 
to the institution (Hartle, 1991). Dartmouth simply did not collect the full tuition owed 
by these students and had no other revenue source to make up the difference. This 
2 
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example is among the eru:liest forms of unfunded institutional grants, or discounted 
tuition (Griffith, 1996). By the second half of the 19th century, the practice of 
discounting tuition became widespread as colleges set tuition slightly above cost in order 
to subsidize disadvantaged students (Hartle, 1991 ). More than two centuries later, tuition 
discounting is an entrenched practice in higher education. 
These historical examples demonstrate two different types of institutional aid for 
students. Funded institutional aid, like the Mowlson scholarship at Harvard, is linked to 
a restricted revenue source like a gift or endowment (U.S. Dept. of Education, 2011b). 
There is no cost to the institution to provide this type of aid. The income exists and can 
only be used for financial aid. Unfunded institutional aid, like the uncollected tuition at 
Dartmouth, lacks a restricted source of revenue and must come from general institutional 
funds (U.S. Dept. of Education, 2011 b). This type of aid includes an opportunity cost to 
the institution since the general funds devoted to student financial aid cannot be used for 
other purposes, such as operational expenses (Martin, 2004). Both types of institutional 
aid serve to discount tuition by requiring a student to pay less than the published price. 
From 2000 to 2009, insti~tional aid comprised the largest source of grant aid to 
college students, ranging from 38% to 43% of total grant aid during the period (College 
Board, 2011 b). Institutional aid represents an even larger portion of total student grants 
at private four-year colleges and universities. As shown in Figure 1, institutional aid 
accounted for 81.3% of total student grants at private institutions in 2009 compared to 
44.5% at their public peers. Unfunded institutional aid has steadily increased as a 
percentage of total student grants at private institutions since 2002 and accounted for 
nearly two-thirds of all grant aid to students at private institutions in 2009. 
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Figure 1. Institutional grant aid as a percentage of total grant aid at four-year institutions, 
2000-2009. Author's calculations from U.S. Department of Education, National Center 
for Educational Statistics, 1999-2009 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System. 
The term "unrestricted" is used under accounting rules for public institutions and 
"unfunded" under accounting rules for private institutions. Both terms refer to the same 
type of institutional grant. Public institution data first became available in 2002. 
According to annual surveys by the National Association of College and 
University Business Officers (NACUBO), which defines the tuition discount rate as total 
institutional aid (funded and unfunded) divided by gross tuition and fees, the rate of 
tuition discounting is on the rise. At private colleges and universities, the discount rate 
increased from 33.6% to 37.1% over the past decade (Almanac of Higher Education, 
2011 ). As shown in Figure 2, the discount rate for first-time freshmen is even higher, 
increasing from 26.7% in 1990 to 42.4% in 2010 (Fain, 2010a; Merea, 2010). The 
freshmen differential indicates institutions must provide higher discounts to enroll new 
students, which in turn drives up the average discount rate for all undergraduates over 
time. Concern continues to grow over the rate of discounting in higher education. In a 
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survey of 956 campus chief executives, Lederman and Jaschik (20 11) reported that nearly 
a third responded the discount rate is dangerously high at their institution. 
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Figure 2. Tuition discount rates for private four-year institutions. Adapted from 2010 
Tuition Discounting Study Report by the National Association of College and University 
Business Officers, 2011, p. 8. 
Colleges as Price Discriminators 
Price discrimination is "the practice of charging different prices to different 
consumers for the same good" (Desjardins & Bell, 2006, p. 69). Tuition discounting is 
possible because colleges are price discriminators, charging some students more than 
others (Baum, 1998). By the second half of the 19th century, private colleges charged 
tuition above the average cost (Hartle, 1991). The surplus provided by students able to 
pay the full tuition price subsidized those unable to pay, described as a "Robin Hood" 
effect (Allan, 1999; Hubbell & Rush, 1991, p. ). 
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Under perfect price discrimination, the maximum amount a customer is willing or 
able to pay is charged (Baum, 1998). Perfect price discrimination requires perfect 
information, which is rarely, if ever, available (Basch, 1997; DesJardins & Bell, 2006). 
Though willingness to pay is much more difficult to ascertain, colleges do receive 
detailed information on ability to pay when a student applies for financial aid. If a 
student does not apply for aid, then ability to pay the full tuition is assumed (Ehrenberg & 
Sherman, 1984). In applying for financial aid, the prospective student provides detailed 
information on family income and other assets. As Martin and Gillen (2011) suggested, 
''No one would consider sharing this much detailed family financial data with their car 
dealer or roofing contractor, yet for higher education, it is standard operating procedure" 
(p. 6). This information gives a college the ability to charge close to the amount a student 
is able to pay, even if not the full amount the student is willing to pay. 
Under second-degree price discrimination, price varies based on the amount 
purchased (DesJardins & Bell, 2006). This includes providing bulk discounts, so that 
customers buying a larger quantity pay a lower price. Colleges cannot often engage in 
this type of price discrimination, but it can occur. For instance, some colleges provide a 
discount to families with more than one student enrolled. This also occurs to some level 
when the number of family members in college is considered as a component of 
calculating a family's ability to pay. In general, however, a student is purchasing one 
tuition unit (credit hour, semester, etc.) from a college. 
Third-degree price discrimination segments the market and varies price among the 
segments based on demand elasticity (DesJardins & Bell, 2006). Colleges most 
frequently apply this type of price discrimination. Historically, students demonstrating 
need were the most price sensitive and provided with the most aid, but recent decades 
witnessed a shift as students of means began to compare competing financial aid 
packages and demand discounted tuition (Baum, 1998; Brown, 2007; De Vise, 2011). 
Colleges now develop detailed matrices to maximize the use of institutional aid (Kurz & 
Scannell, 2005). This often results in institutional aid packages increasingly providing 
non-need-based aid to students of means. Whereas colleges once used price 
discrimination to subsidize students with need, now colleges often use price 
discrimination to subsidize students able to pay in order to maximize the tuition revenue 
collected. 
A college's ability to price discriminate and discount tuition are interrelated. 
Price discrimination provides the basis for discounting tuition, but the increasing rate of 
tuition discounting actually implies the ability to price discriminate is declining among 
colleges (Doti, 2004). Only the most selective colleges, which enjoy high demand from 
potential students, maintain strong price discrimination ability. Institutions with less 
demand must discount tuition in order to meet enrollment goals (Bowen & Breneman, 
1993). 
The Mechanics of Tuition Discounting 
Figure 3 includes the relationship of price and demand for enrollment in 
examining the mechanics of tuition discounting. The demand for enrollment (D) slopes 
downward, indicating that as published price (P) increases, the enrollment demand 
decreases (Breneman, 1994). The intersection of published price and demand equals the 
number of full pay students (XFP ). Only a very small number of colleges have sufficient 
demand to enroll an entire class of students willing to pay the published price (Bowen & 
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Breneman, 1993; Breneman, 1994). The overwhelming majority of colleges are forced to 
enroll partial pay students (Xpp) by providing institutional aid to discount tuition along 
the demand curve in order to reach the desired total enrollment (XN). The area of triangle 
abc is the amount of institutional aid required to enroll Xpp students based on the 
enrollment demand, so the tuition discount rate equals the area of abc I (P x XN). 
D 
Enrollment (n) 
Figure 3. The mechanics of tuition discounting. Adapted from Liberal Arts Colleges: 
Thriving, Surviving, or Endangered? by D. W. Breneman, 1994, p. 42. 
This model demonstrates the difference between funded and unfunded 
institutional aid. With funded aid, the college applies actual dollars from gifts or 
endowment income to supplement a student's paid tuition to reach the published price. 
Therefore, the model does not include funded aid. Unfunded aid is shown to be the 
amount of tuition revenue the college could never collect based upon demand for 
enrollment. Some administrators may consider the institutional aid budget to be purely 
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an expense, something that can be increased or decreased without affecting tuition 
revenues (Breneman, 1994; Cheslock, 2006). This model shows otherwise. The 
unfunded aid in triangle abc is required to enroll the desired number of students (XN). 
Until the mid-1990s, colleges could "gross up tuition revenue" by displaying gross tuition 
as revenue and institutional aid as an expense (Allan, 1999, p. 13). Accounting standards 
now require noting allowances to tuition, which largely consist of unfunded aid, as 
contra-revenue under gross tuition (Allan, 1999). This change reflects the discounts 
provided through unfunded aid are necessary to collect the total tuition revenue. 
The model also clearly shows the financial gains possible by discounting tuition 
through unfunded aid. By providing the unfunded aid in triangle abc, a college collects 
the additional tuition revenue from a to c under the demand curve. Breneman (1994) 
argued a college should discount tuition if the amount of tuition paid is greater than the 
marginal cost for enrolling the student. Marginal costs, the amount required to educate 
the nth student, decrease as the number of students enrolled goes up. For example, a 
college with 1,200 enrolled students faces a much lower cost to educate the 1,201 st 
student. 
Reaping financial gain from discounting tuition requires a college has the existing 
capacity to enroll these partial pay students. A college's physical and instructional 
capacity must be sufficient for the additional students (Martin, 2002). Physical capacity 
includes housing, classroom, and dining space. Instructional capacity includes teaching 
faculty and space in courses. If enrolling additional students requires a college to create 
more physical or instructional capacity, then discounting tuition ceases to be financially 
advantageous. 
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Applying the model to a hypothetical example demonstrates the financial gain 
possible from applying marginal cost pricing by discounting tuition. In 2011, Exemplary 
College publishes a tuition price of $30,000 with a desired enrollment of 1,500 students 
and the existing capacity to support that enrollment. As shown in Figure 4, only 800 
students enroll at the published price. If Exemplary provides no discounts, tuition 
revenue totals $24 million ($30,000 x 800 students). If, however, Exemplary chooses to 
provide $12 million in unfunded institutional aid, it can enroll the 700 partial pay 
students from a to c, reaching the goal of 1 ,500 students. Enrolling these partial pay 
students generates $9 million in tuition revenue [($30,000 x 700 students)- $12 million] 
for total tuition revenue of $33 million, a 38% increase over enrolling only full pay 
students. Exemplary College's tuition discount rate is 27% ($12 million in unfunded 
institutional aid I $45 million in gross tuition). 
D 
§ 
·-
-~ 
700 
800 1,500 
Enrollment 
Figure 4. A hypothetical application of tuition discounting at Exemplary College. 
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Another hypothetical scenario demonstrates how movement along the demand 
curve can impact a college's discount rate over time. In 2005, Exemplary College 
published a tuition price of$25,000 with a desired enrollment of 1,500 students and the 
existing capacity to support that enrollment. Only 900 students enrolled at the published 
price, so Exemplary provided $8 million in unfunded institutional aid to enroll 600 partial 
pay students and reach the desired enrollment. Total tuition revenue in this scenario 
equals $29.5 million [($25,000 x 900 students)+ (($25,000 x 600 students)- $8 million)]. 
However, the tuition discount rate is only 21.3% [$8 million in unfunded aid I ($25,000 x 
1,500 students)]. A change in price moving along the demand curve resulted in an 
increase of5.7 percentage points between 2005 and 2010. 
§ 
..... 
-~ 
D 
800~ 900 
Enrollment 
1,500 
Figure 5. The resulting increase in tuition discounting from an increase in price at 
hypothetical Exemplary College from 2005 to 2010. 
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Figure 5 illustrates the hypothetical shift in discounting from 2005 to 2010 at 
Exemplary College. The increase in tuition required the additional unfunded institutional 
aid represented by the area of abde ($4 million) to reach the desired enrollment of 1,500 
students. 
Causes of Increased Tuition Discounting 
A number of causes led to the rise in tuition discounting in recent decades. First, 
institutions were forced to meet a greater portion of student need as federal grant 
programs and family income failed to keep pace with escalating tuition prices (Basch, 
1997; Griffith, 1996; Ruterbusch, 2004). Through the 1970s, tuition prices increased in 
line with or below the general rate of inflation and family income growth (Basch, 1997). 
This changed dramatically in the 1980s as rapidly increasing tuition prices grew well 
beyond general inflation and family income (Hauptman, 1990). Federal grants, including 
the Pell grant program, failed to keep pace as a percentage of tuition cost (Singell & 
Stone, 2007). Colleges and universities filled the resulting gap with institutional aid. 
Second, a shrinking pool of traditional college-age students in the 1970s and 
1980s increased the competition for enrollment (Breneman, 1994; Davis, 2003; Day, 
2007; Goral, 2003; Griffith, 1996). With fewer students available to enroll, institutions 
engaged in pricing competition, offering larger institutional aid packages to entice 
students to enroll. This trend has resurfaced with declining numbers of high school 
graduates expected in the Midwest and Northeast through 2018, which could increase 
price competition among colleges and universities in those regions (Hussar & Bailey, 
2009). 
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Third, institutions provided pricing incentives to attract more culturally diverse 
student bodies (Baum, Lapovsky, & Ma, 2010; Davis, 2003; Griffith, 1996; Ruterbusch, 
2004). As institutions increasingly emphasized diversity, competition intensified for 
students with the desired characteristics. Colleges and universities responded with more 
generous financial aid packages to encourage targeted students to enroll. 
Fourth, the market-prospective students and their families-demanded lower 
prices in order to meet institutional enrollment goals (Basch, 1997; Bowen & Breneman, 
1993; Brown, 2007; Ruterbusch 2004). Prospective students often pit the financial aid 
package from one college against another (Brown, 2007; De Vise, 2011). In this way, 
tuition discounting increased because most institutions were offering discounts. The 
outcome is often increased discount rates simply to match the rates of competitors 
(McPherson & Shapiro, 1998). 
Finally, colleges applied marginal cost pricing, taking advantage of the lower 
costs of educating each additional student, in an effort to increase institutional revenues 
(Doti, 2004; Ruterbusch, 2004). The amount each additional student pays beyond the 
marginal cost can be viewed as surplus revenue (Breneman, 1994). When applied to 
institutional financial aid, a college or university can offer a larger aid package to enroll 
additional students in order to increase the incoming tuition revenue as previously 
demonstrated in Figures 3 and 4. The long-term implications of marginal cost pricing 
can be negative in higher education, but financial windfalls can result in the short term 
(Martin, 2004). 
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Clarifying Tuition Discounting Terminology 
A point of confusion regarding tuition discounting is the lack of a universal 
definition or rate calculation, which is highly problematic in evaluating studies 
(Ruterbusch, 2004). Three operationalized terms, each with a distinct calculation, are 
used synonymously for discount rates. Although used synonymously, each is targeted to 
inform distinct groups of stakeholders. Understanding the differences is crucial to 
undertaking any analysis of tuition discounting. 
The simple tuition discount, or unfunded institutional discount, is the amount of 
revenue forfeited by an institution from the published tuition price through unfunded aid. 
It is calculated as unfunded aid (UA) divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees 
(GTMF), or UA I GTMF (Allan, 2007). Martin (2004) described this as "the true 
discount rate" because of the associated opportunity cost (p. 178). For each dollar of 
unfunded institutional aid, there is one less dollar available in general funds. The simple 
tuition discount is of most interest to the administrative stakeholders, including the board, 
president, and chief financial officer (Allan, 1999). This group is most concerned with 
the institution's bottom line: the amount of net tuition revenue available to spend. 
The scholarship allowance is the total amount of institutional aid provided to a 
student and includes both unfunded aid and funded aid. It is calculated as unfunded aid 
plus funded aid (FA) divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees, or (UA +FA) I GTMF 
(Allan, 2007). This is the rate required of private institutions by the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the calculation used by Baum et al. (2010) and 
the NACUBO survey report cited above (Allan, 1999). Despite the F ASB requirement, 
the scholarship allowance is of most interest to prospective students. It represents the 
tuition due to the institution either through direct payment or external financial aid. 
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The student tuition discount is the total amount of scholarships and grants 
provided to a student, including both funded and unfunded institutional aid plus other 
scholarships and grants awarded outside the institution. It is calculated as unfunded aid 
plus funded aid plus external grants (EG) divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees, or 
(VA + FA + EG) I GTMF (Allan, 2007). The marketing stakeholders, including 
admissions officers, focus on the student tuition discount (Allan, 1999). This group is 
most concerned with the student's bottom line: the amount required to attend the 
institution. 
From the institutional perspective, the rate of most concern is the unfunded 
institutional discount, which reflects only the amount of unfunded institutional aid 
provided (Breneman, 1994; Martin, 2004). In comparison, the scholarship allowance 
contains two distinct components, funded and unfunded institutional aid, both of which 
are of interest to the institution, but for different reasons. Funded aid exists as revenue 
from gifts or endowment that can only be used to provide scholarships to students. 
Unfunded aid requires the forfeiture of general funds that are then unavailable for other 
purposes. In purely fmancial terms, the amount of funded aid available is positive for the 
institution whereas the unfunded aid provided is negative. For every dollar of funded aid 
raised by an institution, the amount of unfunded aid can be reduced by one dollar (Allan, 
1999). Colleges should, therefore, strive to maximize the available amount of funded 
institutional aid (Martin, 2004 ). The external grants included in the student tuition 
discount provide institutional income and, like funded aid, are positive. Unfunded aid is 
the lone aspect of the three calculations warranting institutional concern. This study 
applies an institutional perspective and, therefore, focuses on the unfunded institutional 
discount unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
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The unfunded institutional discount rate focuses on unfunded institutional aid, but 
there is not an existing term or rate calculation focused entirely on funded institutional 
aid. Therefore, a term must be introduced. The funded institutional discount is the 
amount of the published tuition price supplemented through funded aid. It is calculated 
as funded aid divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees, or FA I GTMF. Since funded 
institutional aid exists from a gift or endowment source, it supplements tuition revenue 
and allows for aided students to receive discounted tuition without an opportunity cost to 
the institution. 
Another relevant term emerging in the literature is financial aid leveraging, which 
is "any scholarship and aid strategy intended to increase net tuition revenue" (Day, 2007, 
p. 34). Financial aid leveraging falls within tuition discounting, but specifies a strategic 
element. Accepted students receive aid packages based on increasing the likelihood of 
enrollment by students capable of paying a large portion of the published tuition price. 
As a nearly universal practice, many institutions now discount tuition by default. 
Financial aid leveraging is used to convey the strategic importance of fmancial aid 
packages in enrollment management (Kurz & Scannell, 2005; Scannell & Kurz, 2003). 
A college attempting to leverage financial aid maintains, or possibly even 
reduces, the tuition discount rate, but awards the institutional aid to students within a 
strategic design to maximize incoming revenue. For example, if after analyzing past 
enrollment data, a college finds an additional $1,000 in financial aid significantly 
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increases the likelihood of enrolling students paying 90% of the published tuition price, 
then the college would shift fmancial aid resources to provide those packages to targeted 
students. When those targeted students enroll, incoming tuition revenue increases. 
Statement of the Research Problem 
Colleges historically charged a surplus to students of means in order to provide 
tuition discounts to students with need (Baum, 1998; Hartle, 1991 ). Recent decades saw 
the rise of tuition discounting for other reasons ranging from enrolling more qualified 
students to enticing the desired number of students to enroll to maximize institutional 
revenues (Baum et al., 2010; Bowen & Breneman, 1993). Discount rates have grown 
faster than the increase in tuition to accommodate more than just meeting student need. 
This increase in discounting implies a weakening ability to price discriminate by colleges 
(Doti, 2004). The loss of price discrimination as a tactic to maximize revenue means 
students able to pay more are no longer supplementing the tuition of those paying less. 
Without the surpluses paid by these students, the foundation of the financial model long 
used by private baccalaureate colleges begins to erode. In 1994, the continuing rise of 
tuition discounting was described as "among the most troubling economic problems" 
facing private colleges (Breneman, p. 36). Since then, tuition discount rates have risen 
even further, prompting even highly selective, wealthy colleges to question if the current 
financial model is sustainable (Kiley, 2011a). Other less selective colleges with lower 
endowments have closed or been purchased by for-profit education companies 
(Biemiller, 2011a; Blumenstyk, 2007; Huckabee, 2010). The problem of tuition 
discounting exists at the intersection of tuition prices and revenue, unfunded institutional 
aid, and demand for enrollment. 
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Tuition Prices and Revenue 
Increases in published tuition prices have outpaced inflation for decades. From 
1989 to 2005, tuition increased at double the rate of general inflation (Kantrowitz, 2011 ). 
These price increases are, at least partially if not entirely, linked to rising costs in higher 
education. Two dominant theories address the driving forces behind these rising costs. 
Cost disease theory holds that labor-intensive service industries face costs that 
continually rise faster than inflation due to lagging productivity gains (Baumol & Bowen, 
1966). Empirical data supports the presence of cost disease in higher education, which 
has seen annual productivity grow by only 0.5% annually since 1870 based on student-
faculty ratios (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; Baumol & Blackman, 1995; Trombella, 
2011 ). The revenue theory of costs holds that a college takes in all revenues possible 
while simultaneously spending all revenue collected; therefore, the only constraint on 
spending is the amount of collected revenue (Bowen, 1980). Empirical data also supports 
the revenue theory of costs (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ). Since cost disease theory addresses 
an external force (general inflation driving labor costs) and the revenue theory of costs 
addresses an internal force (available revenue), both could be acting in concert to push 
tuition prices higher. 
Increases in tuition price do not necessarily yield increases in net tuition revenue, 
the amount of tuition an institution is actually able to collect after providing institutional 
aid. On average, simultaneous increases in institutional aid negate tuition increases at 
private colleges (Breneman, Doti, & Lapovsky, 2001). Tuition increases often result in 
reduced net tuition revenue at colleges providing high levels of unfunded institutional aid 
(Redd, 2000). According to the NACUBO survey, net tuition revenue fell by 2.5% in 
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2008 compared to the previous year at private institutions (Merea, 201 0). In 2009, net 
tuition revenue declined at 15% of private colleges (Fain, 2010b). The ability to generate 
the necessary revenue to meet rising costs through tuition increases is inextricably linked 
to the provision of unfunded institutional aid. 
Demand for Enrollment 
The demand for enrollment drives an institution's ability to charge students more 
of the published tuition price. Selective, high-priced colleges enjoy higher levels of 
demand for enrollment, which reduces pressure to provide unfunded institutional aid to 
reach enrollment goals (Basch, 1996). Less selective colleges are much more likely to 
suffer shortfalls in net revenue growth compared to highly selective colleges, which are 
often immune to these shortfalls (Basch, 1997). Beyond admissions selectivity, colleges 
with lower yield rates face increased pressure to discount tuition (Baum et al., 201 0). 
The resulting quest to enroll students can create "a death grip of competition" (Biemiller, 
201lb, "Introduction," para. 13). 
Tuition price and financial aid also influence demand for enrollment. In general, 
increases in tuition prices reduce enrollment demand, which is reflected in lower 
enrollment numbers or yield rates (Buss, Parker, & Rivenberg, 2004; Ehrenberg & 
Sherman, 1984). Conversely, increases in financial aid generally encourage enrollment 
(Ehrenberg & Sherman, 1984; Heller, 1997; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987; St. John, 1990, 
1993). Even the failure to meet a prospective student's expectation of financial aid can 
negatively impact enrollment (DesJardins, Ahlburg, & McCall, 2006). 
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Unfunded Institutional Aid 
Institutional aid represents a major component of grants to students at private 
colleges and universities. As shown in Figure 1, the amount of unfunded institutional aid 
increased from 57.8% to 63.5% of total student grants at private institutions between 
2000 and 2009. This aid provided discounted tuition to students that made college more 
affordable, but simultaneously resulted in foregoing possible tuition revenue for the 
institution (see Figure 3). As median family income fell6.4% during the recession from 
2007 to 2009, colleges simultaneously increased tuition discounting (Ensign, 2010). The 
average scholarship allowance provided by private colleges rose from 34.9% to 37.1% 
during this period (NACUBO, 2011). Much ofthis increase came through unfunded 
institutional aid, which is inextricably linked with demand for enrollment (see Figure 3). 
Statement of Purpose and Research Questions 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of tuition discounting on 
institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at private 
baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. Market strength, the ability to enroll a 
sufficient number of students yielding sufficient tuition revenue, is a critical component 
of an institution's overall financial strength, particularly at private baccalaureate colleges, 
which are overwhelmingly dependent upon tuition for survival. To this end, this study 
seeks to address the overarching question: What are the implications of tuition 
discounting for institutional market strength at private baccalaureate colleges between 
2000 and 2009? The following research sub-questions are pursued: 
1. What is the relationship of the tuition price elasticity of demand for full-pay and 
aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate? 
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2. Given the outcome of Question 1, what is the relationship of the price elasticity of 
demand for full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate 
based on admissions selectivity? 
3. How, if at all, has the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 affected the ratio of 
funded and unfunded institutional discount rates? 
4. Given the outcome of Question 3, how, if at all, has the economic recession from 
2007 to 2009 affected the balance of funded and unfunded institutional aid based 
on endowment? 
Delimiting the Study to Private Baccalaureate Colleges 
Tuition discounting is practiced across the spectrum of higher education 
institutions, including public and private, two-year and four-year, and American and 
international (Baum et al., 2010; Dotterweich & Baryla, 2005; McPherson & Shapiro, 
1995; Parrott, 2008). Private baccalaureate colleges provide an especially appropriate 
sample to investigate tuition discounting for several reasons. 
Table 1 
Selected Revenue Sources as Percentage ofTotal Revenue, 2009 
Tuition State Investment 
Institution Type and Fees Appropriations Losses 
All Public, 4-year 20.1 23.5 -4.6 
All Private Not-for-Profit, 4-year 77.8 2.6 -93.5 
Private Not-for-Profit, Baccalaureate 124.2 3.0 -124.3 
Note. Author's calculations from U.S. Department of Education, National Center for 
Educational Statistics, 2008-2009 Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System. 
First, private baccalaureate colleges have limited sources of revenue. Whereas 
state appropriations provide substantial contributions to public colleges and universities, 
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tuition represents the majority of revenue at private institutions (Wellman, Desrochers, & 
Lenihan, 2008). Private baccalaureate colleges are particularly dependent upon tuition 
revenue. As shown in Table 1, tuition and fees at these colleges accounted for six times 
the percentage of total revenue in 2009 as at public four-year institutions and a 
substantially higher percentage than at all private four-year institutions. The heavy 
investment losses merely amplified the need for tuition revenue in the absence of other 
major revenue streams. 
Second, private baccalaureate colleges provide isolated undergraduate tuition 
data. At institutions with graduate programs, the revenue reported to the Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) includes all tuition and fees. There is no 
differentiation between graduate and undergraduate tuition. Further, undergraduate 
tuition funds more than just the cost of undergraduate education at research universities 
(Ehrenberg, 2000). These research-intensive institutions use undergraduate tuition to pay 
for other expenses beyond the cost of undergraduate education, such as supplementing 
research funding (Ehrenberg, 2000; Sperber, 2001). Private baccalaureate colleges 
provide IPEDS data reporting undergraduate tuition funding institutions focused on 
undergraduate education. 
Third, the tuition dependence of private baccalaureate colleges makes tuition 
discounting of the utmost importance to these institutions. A mistake in providing too 
much unfunded institutional aid at one of these colleges holds dire consequences for a 
fiscal year. A mistake in a single year generally takes four years to fully cycle out of the 
institution. Extended or repeated mistakes risk a college's very survival. In the words of 
a former college president, "If you discount too much, you're on your way to oblivion" 
(Finder, 2006, p. A16). 
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For these reasons, this study focuses on tuition discounting through unfunded aid 
at private baccalaureate colleges, defined as private, not-for-profit, four-year institutions 
in the United States classified as baccalaureate by the Carnegie Foundation with 
exclusively undergraduate enrollment. Carnegie baccalaureate colleges annually award 
less than 50 master's degrees or 20 doctoral degrees (Carnegie Foundation, 2010). 
Limitations of the Study 
This study is limited by the self-reported nature of the data analyzed. IPEDS data 
is widely used in research given the required submission by all institutions participating 
in federal financial aid programs, yet it consists of unaudited reports (National Center for 
Educational Statistics, 2011). The lack of audited data is a limitation (Griffith, 1996; 
Stump, 2001 ). This limitation may be particularly acute at private baccalaureate colleges, 
which generally lack a large staff specifically assigned to gathering and reporting 
institutional research data. 
Significance of the Study 
This study both contributes to the scholarship in the area and applies directly to 
practitioners. The relationship of price elasticity of demand to unfunded institutional aid 
remains a topic unexamined by previous studies, a gap this dissertation seeks to fill. 
Likewise, the effect of the recession from 2007 to 2009 on the balance of funded and 
unfunded institutional aid remains unexamined, another gap this dissertation seeks to fill. 
The increasing use of unfunded institutional aid and its implications regarding 
demand for enrollment threaten the very survival of private baccalaureate colleges. Dana 
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College in Nebraska, a private baccalaureate college that closed in 2010, offers IPEDS 
data providing financial insight into a dying institution (National Center for Educational 
Statistics, 2010). From 2000 to 2009, Dana College saw its unfunded institutional 
discount increase from 40% to 53%. In that final decade, between 95% and 100% of 
undergraduates received institutional financial aid packages, which more than doubled in 
amount during the period. In spite of these measures, enrollment declined by nearly 12% 
from 2005 to 2009. This study will provide highly applicable lessons as to the warning 
signs to avoid financial catastrophe by discounting tuition too much. 
Summary 
The rates of tuition discounting have been on the rise for decades. Institutions 
should be particularly concerned with the amount of discounts provided by unfunded. 
institutional aid. In contrast to funded institutional aid, which has a restricted source such 
as a gift or endowment, unfunded institutional aid includes an opportunity cost since 
those funds cannot be used for other operational expenses. The demand model of tuition 
discounting reveals that the unfunded aid is, in fact, required in order to reach the desired 
enrollment. Otherwise, partial pay students would not enroll based upon a college's 
demand. Tuition discounting can result in increased revenues through marginal cost 
pricing, but often results in stagnant, or even declining, net tuition revenue given the 
prevalence of discounts. The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of 
tuition discounting on institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded 
institutional aid at private baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of tuition discounting on 
institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at private 
baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. This chapter reviews the existing literature 
relevant to the topic. First, Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college is presented 
as the theoretical framework for the study. The literature is then organized into three 
categories: pricing, enrollment patterns, and tuition discounting. Rising costs, contrasting 
tuition pricing models, and the current economic climate are explored within literature 
related to pricing in higher education. Price elasticity, the effect of fmancial aid on 
enrollment, and components of student choice models are explored within literature 
related to enrollment patterns in higher education. Finally, studies reporting discount 
rates and previous work directly focused on tuition discounting in higher education are 
presented. 
Breneman's Theory of the Private College 
Breneman (1994) posited an economic theory of the private college that provides 
a framework to understand decision-making at private colleges in relation to tuition 
discounting. The theory's two-stage process of value maximization builds upon Hopkins 
and Massey's (1981) economic model of a university. 
In the Hopkins and Massey ( 1981) model, universities seek to maximize a value 
function consisting of three variables: activities, stocks, and prices. Each variable 
admittedly possesses tangible and intangible qualities. Activities include nearly anything 
occurring at the university in a given period. Stocks include institutional assets such as 
buildings, equipment, and endowment. Prices include tuition, salaries, utility rates, and 
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other factors with a monetary value. University administrators seek to maximize the 
value of activities, stocks, and prices in two stages. The first stage sets basic institutional 
operation patterns; the second stage seeks to maximize the qualitative aspects of the 
operation (Hopkins & Massey, 1981 ). 
Thus, private colleges establish an operational pattern (stage one) and then seek to 
maximize the quality of that operation (stage two) in Breneman's (1994) theory. The 
value function v (XQ, Xo * I XN, x*, P) describes this process. 1 In the first stage, the 
college establishes a desired enrollment level (XN), fixed inputs (X*) such as faculty and 
facilities to support that enrollment, and tuition price (P) to fund the operation. These 
variables are highly interrelated. Once established, adjusting any individual variable 
impacts the other variables. A college can most easily change tuition, which merely 
requires a decision be made and published. Enrollment and fixed inputs require much 
more effort to change. 
Most decisions regarding a college's operational pattern have long since been 
made. Only a brand new institution has the opportunity to establish these characteristics 
without historical influence. Existing colleges must act strategically within operational 
patterns developed throughout the institution's history, such as faculty size and campus 
facilities. Changes can be made, but institutional momentum, or inertia, makes 
substantial changes to existing operational patterns difficult. 
In the second stage, a college seeks to maximize student quality (XQ) and the 
quality of fixed inputs (XQ *). Student quality characteristics include desired academic 
1 In the value function, V stands for value, XN = desired enrollment level, x* = fixed 
inputs for the desired enrollment, P = tuition price, Xo = student quality, and Xo • = fixed 
input quality. 
qualification and diversity levels. The quality of fixed inputs includes faculty 
qualifications and physical plant characteristics. 
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Two constraints bind decisions in either stage. First, an enrollment constraint 
includes the number of students falling within an acceptable range (XuL 2: XN 2: XLL; 
Breneman, 1994). Physical and instructional capacities largely determine the upper 
acceptable limit (XUL) for enrollment. Revenue requirements largely determine the lower 
acceptable limit (XLL). In other words, a college equipped and priced to educate 1,500 
students cannot generate the necessary revenue if only 150 students enroll. Some 
flexibility exists within this range, though physical capacities are relatively static. For 
instance, it is much easier to adjust the student-faculty ratio than to construct a new 
dormitory or academic building. Second, budgets are constrained by the requirement that 
total revenue (TR) must be greater than or equal to total cost (TC), or TR - TC 2: 0 
(Breneman, 1994). Stage one decisions establish appropriate enrollment and tuition 
levels to generate sufficient revenue for the college. Stage two decisions cannot create a 
deficit in the effort to increase quality. Figure 6 presents a visual adaptation of 
Breneman's (1994) value function for private colleges. 
In accordance with Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college, tuition 
discounting decisions can be made in either of the two stages based on the institutional 
motivation for providing the discount. In a stage one tuition discounting decision, a 
college would provide a discount to reach the desired enrollment level without regard to 
student characteristics. In a stage two decision, a college without concern for reaching 
the desired enrollment level would provide a discount to maximize student quality 
characteristics. 
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Figure 6. A visual model ofBreneman's theory of private colleges. Adapted from 
Liberal Arts Colleges: Thriving, Surviving, or Endangered? by D. W. Breneman, 1994, 
pp. 36-54, 164-166. 
These differing motivations illustrate that unfunded institutional aid can be either 
a price discount or educational investment (Bowen & Breneman, 1993). A college with 
insufficient demand must discount the price in order to reach the desired enrollment. A 
college with sufficient demand to enroll an entire class of full pay students can choose to 
provide institutional aid as an educational investment to ensure desired characteristics 
within the enrolling class. In reality, colleges fall along a continuum between the two 
(Bowen & Breneman, 1993). 
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Pricing in Higher Education 
Price and costs in higher education are inextricably linked. As costs increase, so 
must the tuition price. This section explores the literature related to pricing and costs in 
higher education. 
Rising Costs in Higher Education 
Rising costs drive tuition increases (Hubbell, 1992; Massy, 2008). Costs in 
higher education have grown substantially faster than the general rate of inflation, which 
is commonly measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The CPI measures the 
changes in price over time of consumer goods and services, which are organized into 
eight groups: food and beverages, housing, apparel, transportation, medical care, 
recreation, education and communication, and other goods and services (Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2011 ). In response to the different goods purchased in higher education as 
compared to an urban consumer, the Commonfund Institute developed the Higher 
Education Price Index (HEPI), an industry-specific inflation measure. The HEPI is based 
on more than 100 categories also organized into eight groups: faculty salaries, 
administrative salaries, clerical salaries, service employee salaries, fringe benefits, 
miscellaneous services, supplies and materials, and utilities (Commonfund, 2010). 
Figure 7 compares growth in the HEPI and CPl. In 1983, both indexes had a base 
value of 100. Since that time, the HEPI increased by 181.8% compared to an increase of 
120.8% in the CPl. From 1970 to 1979, the HEPI increased at a lower rate than the CPl. 
The 1980s witnessed a dramatic shift as the HEPI increased 71.4% compared to an 
increase of 56.1% in the CPI, a difference of 15.2 percentage points. This coincides with 
the rapid growth of tuition during the same timeframe (Hauptman, 1990). 
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Figure 7. Comparing inflation as measured by the Consumer Price Index and Higher 
Education Price Index, 1961-2010. Adapted from Higher Education Price Index: 2010 
Update by the Commonfund Institute, 2010. 
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Figure 8. Comparing increases in average tuition at private, four-year institutions to the 
Higher Education Price Index, 1981-2010. Adapted from Higher Education Price Index: 
2010 Update by the Commonfund Institute, 2010; and Trends in College Pricing 2011 by 
College Board, 2011. 
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As shown in Figure 8, tuition and the HEPI increased at similar rates through 
1999. In seven out of the ten years from 2000 to 2009, the HEPI actually rose at a faster 
rate than tuition. This data supports the premise that rising costs drive tuition price 
increases and also indicates that institutional revenues must be maximized in order to 
keep pace with inflation as measured by the HEPI (Massy, 2008). 
Two theories address the continually rising costs in higher education: cost disease 
theory and the revenue theory of costs. Cost disease, first proposed by Baumol and 
Bowen (I966), links cost increases to inflationary forces external to the institution 
(Martin & Gillen, 20II). The revenue theory of costs, proposed by Bowen (I980), links 
cost increases to internal forces, namely an insatiable hunger for more revenue to spend 
(Martin & Gillen, 20 II). Given the distinct external and internal nature of the forces 
behind the respective theories, both theories may act in concert to drive increasing costs 
in higher education. 
Cost Disease Theory. 
Baumol and Bowen (1966) first proposed cost disease in relation to the arts, 
noting that a string quartet required the same amount oflabor today as centuries ago. 
Increased wages generally result from gains in productivity, yet, in the case of a string 
quartet, costs continue to rise despite a constant productivity level. Cost disease theory 
holds that as wages rise in general, the wages for skilled labor must rise even faster to 
attract and retain talent. As such, industries requiring intensive personal application of 
skilled labor suffer increasing labor costs that outpace general inflation despite limited or 
no productivity gains (Baumol & Bowen, I966). Higher education is plagued by cost 
disease given the required personal attention of skilled labor (predominately faculty 
work) and limited ability of technology to alleviate demands on labor (Baumol & 
Blackman, 1995). Even in the growing online sector, a professor is still required to 
encourage and evaluate student learning. 
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Based on student-faculty ratios, Baumol and Blackman (1995) offer a crude 
estimate of0.5% annual growth in higher education productivity since 1870. This 
estimate, in combination with 7.6% average annual increases in expenditures per student 
from 1949 to 1991, supports the presence of cost disease in higher education. Labor 
productivity gains in higher education have been minimal while costs simultaneously 
exceeded the general rate of inflation. 
An analysis of industry-specific data from 1949 to 1994 also supports the 
presence of cost disease in higher education. Archibald and Feldman (2008) used data on 
personal consumption expenditures to examine changes in costs across industry 
categories, finding that costs of higher education outpaced those of manufacturing 
industries such as automobiles or shoes. In fact, higher education costs eclipsed the 
growth of health care costs and were exceeded only by the growth of costs for legal 
services (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). 
A subsequent analysis using a similar framework found personnel costs were the 
main driver of cost increases in higher education from 1961 to 2008. Breaking down the 
components of the Higher Education Price Index, Trombella (20 11) found personnel 
costs, which include professional and nonprofessional salaries, fringe benefits, and total 
personal compensation, grew faster than any other component of this industry-specific 
inflation index. This study simultaneously documented the faster rise of the HEPI 
compared to the CPI as well as the growth of HEPI components. The cost of contracted 
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services grew at a slower rate than the overall HEPI, suggesting the cost-saving strategies 
of outsourcing services and using adjunct faculty reaped some savings and are likely to 
continue expanding. 
The fmdings of Archibald and Feldman (2008) and Trombella (2011) support the 
presence of cost disease in higher education as well as other industries. The rising costs 
pressure colleges to increase prices, which in turn require increased discounts to meet 
enrollment goals. Private baccalaureate colleges, which are highly dependent on tuition 
revenue, face conflicting demands: the pressure to increase revenue to meet rising costs 
and the pressure to provide more financial aid to offset rising tuition prices. 
The Revenue Theory of Costs. 
Stated simply, the revenue theory of costs holds that colleges take in as much 
revenue as possible, and then spend all of it (Bowen, 1980). Under this scenario, the only 
limit to expenditures is the amount of available revenue. Bowen (1980) described the 
circumstances behind the theory as follows: 
Colleges and universities have no strong incentive to cut costs in quest of profits 
because they do not seek profit. They are not forced by competition to lower 
costs in order to survive. This is so partly because they are subsidized by 
government and philanthropy and partly because they are shielded from 
competition by geographic location and by differentiation of services. It is so also 
because institutions know little about the relationship between their expenditures 
and their educational outcomes, and it is easy to drift into the comfortable belief 
that increased expenditures will automatically produce commensurately greater 
outcomes. Under these conditions, the unit costs of operating colleges or 
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universities are set more largely by the amount of money institutions are able to 
raise per unit of service rendered than by the inherent technical requirements of 
conducting their work. Within wide limits, institutions can adjust to whatever 
amount of money they are able to raise. When resources are increased, they find 
uses for the funds, and unit costs go up. When resources are decreased, they 
express keen regret and protest, but in the end they accept the inevitable, and unit 
costs go down. (p. 15) 
The driving force behind costs is internal under this theory (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ). A 
college will increase, hold steady, or decrease costs as dictated by its revenue. According 
to the revenue theory of costs, colleges will continue to raise tuition until the market 
ceases to bear the increases. At, but not until, that point, a college will be forced to 
address its spiraling costs. 
Analyzing the relationship of external financial aid, costs in higher education, and 
institutional spending patterns, Martin and Gillen (20 11) found evidence supporting the 
revenue theory of costs. Between 1987 and 2008, external financial aid increased in 
constant dollars at both public and private institutions. Net price simultaneously 
increased as did institutional spending. Martin and Gillen (20 11) argued that colleges 
and universities merely absorbed the increased external financial aid while 
simultaneously increasing spending by actually reducing faculty productivity as 
measured by student-faculty ratio. Faculty productivity declines when the student-faculty 
ratio decreases since faculty teach fewer students. This decline in faculty productivity 
was paid for by merely absorbing the increased external financial aid funds while 
simultaneously increasing tuition. This scenario aligns perfectly with the revenue theory 
of costs that argues colleges will take in as much revenue as possible and spend all the 
revenue received. 
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According to Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of costs, colleges have an insatiable 
appetite for funds. As with cost disease, this situation yields conflicting pressures at 
private baccalaureate colleges: the continual demand for more revenue and the demand 
for more financial aid to offset tuition increases. 
In sum, both cost disease and the revenue theory of costs address spiraling prices 
in higher education. Cost disease addresses an external component, the increasing cost of 
skilled labor due to inflation in the general economy (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ). The 
revenue theory of costs addresses an internal component, the insatiable drive for more 
money to spend (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ). Both forces may be acting in concert to 
continually drive up tuition prices in higher education. Private baccalaureate colleges, 
dependent upon tuition for the overwhelming majority of revenue, must carefully balance 
the need to increase revenues with the demand for financial aid to offset rising tuition. 
Mistakes in this balance can result in less net revenue, a terrible scenario for a college 
attempting to increase available funds. 
Contrasting Pricing Models in Higher Education 
Two contrasting pricing strategies exist in higher education. The first, often 
called "high tuition, high aid," involves publishing a high tuition price with the 
expectation of distributing a high amount of financial aid (Hillman, 2010). Publishing a 
high tuition price takes advantage of the association of price with quality by prospective 
students and may actually lead to increased prestige in the market (Massy, 2008). This 
association is often called the Chivas Regal effect (Martin, 2011). The second pricing 
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strategy, often called "low tuition, low aid," involves publishing a low tuition price with 
the expectation of distributing a low amount of financial aid (Hillman, 201 0). In theory, 
both strategies yield comparable net tuition revenue after considering the effect of 
financial aid. The sections below describe the Chivas Regal effect and the contrasting 
outcomes for two colleges that moved to a low tuition, low aid model by drastically 
cutting tuition. 
The Chivas Regal Effect. 
Named for a luxury brand of Scotch whiskey, the Chivas Regal effect describes 
the association of price with quality by consumers (Martin, 2011). Stated simply, the 
higher the price, the better the product is perceived to be. Under normal economic 
behavior, demand decreases as price increases (DesJardins & Bell, 2006). In contrast, 
demand rises as price increases under the Chivas Regal effect (Martin, 2011 ). 
According to Martin (2011), higher education, particularly at elite institutions, 
offers a prime example of the Chivas Regal effect due to its nature as an experiential 
good. In this type of good, the level of quality is unknown before purchase. In higher 
education, "one rarely knows how much value has been added until the graduate applies 
that knowledge" (Martin, 2011, p. 53). With prospective students unsure of quality, cost 
is used as an indicator of institutional quality. 
For elite institutions, "the Chivas Regal effect links expenditure per student to 
reputation, so reputation competition becomes a race to spend the most per student in a 
contest with no upper bound" (Martin, 2011, p. 4). At these and other institutions 
seeking to maximize prestige, price can be increased as long as the market will bear the 
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cost (Ehrenberg, 2000). In this way, the Chivas Regal effect mirrors the revenue theory 
of costs as revenue alone constrains institutional spending. 
Larson (1997) attributed the rise of this pricing strategy to Ivy League universities 
and other similar institutions in the 1980s. These elite universities, aware of the tuition 
prices within the peer group, indirectly pushed each other to raise tuition in line with the 
group. In the words of William Massy, formerly of Stanford University, "The theory of it 
was, basically, we will raise the tuition as much as the market will bear" (as cited in 
Larson, 1997, p. 46). The market, prospective students and their families, actually 
encouraged price increases by bearing the cost for elite institutions, which in turn 
emboldens other institutions aspiring to be elite to raise prices to comparable levels. The 
Chivas Regal effect suggests the perceived quality of an aspiring institution in the market 
may increase by raising tuition. 
A study of 1,332 colleges and universities, both public and private, yielded results 
supporting the association of cost with quality. Among the 859 private institutions in the 
sample, Dotterweich and Baryta (2005) found a significant correlation between tuition 
and enrollment for out-of-state students. This increased likelihood of enrollment declined 
in the lower tuition price deciles, indicating students viewed those institutions as 
equivalent substitutes that were less desirable. 
Increasing price can lead to an increase in perceived quality according to the 
Chivas Regal effect, which in turn can lead to an increase in demand. By pricing a 
college's tuition in line with targeted peers, a college can hope to increase demand, 
particularly among students with the means to pay for a perceived higher quality 
education. In the pricing demand model, if demand increases simultaneously with price, 
the college will reap increased net tuition revenues by charging a higher price while 
providing the same amount of unfunded institutional aid. 
Examples of CoUeges Adopting a Low Tuition, Low Aid Model. 
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In an effort to reduce or eliminate tuition discounting, some colleges have moved 
to a low tuition, low aid pricing model. Generally, tuition is cut substantially with the 
understanding that institutional financial aid is simultaneously reduced. In theory, if the 
cuts in tuition are matched by the cuts in institutional aid, there is no loss in net tuition 
revenue. In application, the results have been mixed and appear to vary on a case-by-
case basis. 
Muskingum College in Ohio is frequently cited as an example of an institution 
successfully cutting tuition. In 1996, Muskingum cut tuition by 29% in an effort to curb 
spending on financial aid (Applebome, 1996). The college anticipated a period of reduced 
revenues immediately following the move, planning sufficient time for the strategy to 
succeed. The long-term results have been overwhelmingly positive for the institution. 
Muskingum's enrollment increased 60% and the college began to draw students from a 
broader geographic base (VanDerWerf, 2003). Another concern in cutting tuition was 
the threat of reduced student quality; however, this has not occurred. Applications nearly 
doubled to 1,750 for an enrolling freshmen class of 415 and the average test scores 
remained competitive (VanDerWerf, 2003). 
North Carolina Wesleyan College, which also significantly cut tuition in 1996, 
did not fare as well as Muskingum College. After cutting tuition by 23%, North Carolina 
Wesleyan saw a large increase in students with even greater need than prior to the cut, 
negating the expected gains in net revenue (VanDerWerf, 2003). Seven years later, the 
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college abandoned the policy and returned to higher tuition levels despite the requisite 
financial aid. North Carolina Wesleyan's president at the time concluded, "If you charge 
less, people think you have less to offer. Price is associated with quality. There's no 
question about that" (VanDerWerf, 2003, p. A25). The North Carolina Wesleyan 
outcome supports the notion of a Chi vas Regal effect in higher education. 
Despite the mixed outcomes, other colleges continue attempting similar strategies. 
In February 2011, the University of the South (Sewanee) cut total charges, including 
tuition, fees, room, and board, by 10% (Jaschik, 2011a). According to Sewanee's 
president, the move responds to both the economic climate, increased competition from 
flagship public universities in the region, and a continually increasing discount rate that 
had reached 44% (Supiano, 2011a). In November 2011, The University of Charleston in 
West Virginia announced a 22% tuition cut for the next enrolling class of students (Kiley, 
2011 b). Later that month, Cabrini College in Pennsylvania announced plans to cut 
tuition by 12.5% and limit any increases through May 2015 to $1,000 total (Jaschik, 
2011b; Supiano, 201lb). The outcomes ofthese cuts in tuition remain unknown at this 
time. 
The Current Economic Environment for Private Colleges 
According to the National Bureau of Economic Research (2010), the U.S. 
economy entered a recession in December 2007 that lasted until June 2009. This 18-
month period overlaps with the last years included in this dissertation. The recession 
affected private baccalaureate colleges in two ways. First, endowment values suffered 
substantial losses. Second, students and their families were less able or less willing to 
pay high tuition levels. 
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The value of a college's endowment affects the available amount of funded 
institutional aid as well as supplements the total revenue of the college. From 2008 to 
2009, higher education endowments lost an average of 18.7% of their value (NACUBO, 
201 0). These losses had still not been fully recovered at most institutions by 2011 (Kiley, 
2011c). As shown in Table 2, the endowments with highest values suffered slightly more 
one-year losses, but fared better over the three-year period ending in 2009. 
Table 2 
Annual Total Net Returns for U.S. Higher Education Endowments as of June 30, 2009 
By Type 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 10-Year 
Public Institutions 
Private Institutions 
-17.3 -1.6 3.2 4.1 
-19.1 -2.6 2.9 4.2 
By Endowment Value 1-Year 3-Year 5-Year 10-Year 
More than $1 billion -20.5 -0.8 5.1 6.1 
$501 million to $1 billion -19.8 -2.0 3.5 4.3 
$101 million to $500 million -19.7 -2.5 2.6 3.7 
$51 million to $100 million -18.6 -2.7 2.7 3.7 
$25 million to $50 million -18.5 -3.2 2.1 3.4 
Less than $25 million -16.8 -2.3 2.1 3.9 
Note. Adapted from the 2009 NACUBO-Commonfund Study of Endowments by the 
National Association of College and University Business Officers, 2010. 
The recession's effects linger through elevated rates of unemployment, which 
affects the ability of students and their families to pay tuition. The annual unemployment 
rate swelled from 4.6% in 2007 to 5.8% in 2008 as the recession took hold, and then 
jumped to 9.3% in 2009, the highest rate in 26 years (U.S. Department of Labor, 2011). 
Despite the official end of the recession in 2009, unemployment increased slightly to 
9.6% in 2010. Beyond unemployment, household incomes fell to levels comparable to 
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1996 when adjusted for inflation. As measured by constant 2010 dollars, average 
household income fell 2.3% in 2010 and remains 7.1% below peak levels in 1999 
(Dougherty, 2011). On average, Hispanic and African-American households earn less 
than the national figure by 24% and 35% respectively. 
Reduced endowment values, increased unemployment, and reduced household 
earnings affect the market for prospective students in higher education. Even students 
from households capable of paying higher tuition rates increasingly compare offers of 
admission based on net tuition price after considering financial aid (De Vise, 2011). 
Colleges have responded by increasing tuition discounts and providing institutional aid to 
a higher percentage of enrolling students (NACUBO, 2011 ). This dissertation 
investigates a plausible force driving those responses, increased elasticity of demand 
based on tuition price. 
Enrollment Patterns in Higher Education 
A number of studies have examined the relationship of cost and enrollment in 
higher education. This section is divided into literature on price elasticity, the effect of 
financial aid on enrollment, and models of student choice. 
Price Elasticity in Higher Education 
Price elasticity (PE) measures "the responsiveness of demand to changes in price" 
(Arnold, 2008, p. 377). It is calculated as the ratio of percent change in quantity 
demanded (Qd) to percent change in price (P). The formula for calculating price 
elasticity is 
PE = % change in quantity demanded 
% change in price 
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In a higher education setting, enrollment is the quantity demanded and tuition is the price 
(Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Price elasticity is not the slope of the demand curve, though 
this is a common misconception. Price elasticity varies at each point along the demand 
curve, whereas the slope remains constant (Arnold, 2008). 
Demand as measured by price elasticity can be elastic or inelastic. Elastic 
demand, for which PE > 1, indicates the quantity demanded is highly sensitive to price, 
therefore, an increase in price yields a proportionately greater decrease in quantity 
demanded (Baird, 1976). IfPE = 1, demand is unit elastic, meaning that any percentage 
increase in price yields an equal percentage decrease in quantity demanded (Arnold, 
2008). Inelastic demand, for which PE < 1, indicates the quantity demanded is relatively 
unaffected by price, therefore, an increase in price yields a proportionately lower 
decrease in demand (Baird, 1976). IfPE = 0, demand is perfectly inelastic, meaning that 
the quantity demanded is completely unaffected by an increase in price (Arnold, 2008). 
Several substantial literature reviews concluded that overall demand for higher 
education is relatively inelastic, though the calculated price elasticity varies among 
studies over a number of decades (Heller, 1997; Kim, 2010; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). 
Within the generally inelastic demand for higher education overall, individual institutions 
can vary considerably. A college should be aware of its own price elasticity in setting 
tuition (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). A college with more elastic demand will require 
more fmancial aid to meet enrollment goals, which negatively impacts net tuition 
revenue. If demand is sufficiently elastic, a college can actually lose net revenue despite 
an increase in tuition (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Though several studies considered the 
effect of financial aid on price as a component of price elasticity, none were identified 
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specifically linking an institution's price elasticity with unfunded institutional aid. This 
dissertation contributes to the existing body of literature by examining this relationship. 
The Effect of Financial Aid on Enrollment 
In regard to higher education, demand theory holds that an increase in tuition will 
result in a decline in enrollment. Conversely, an increase in financial aid (decrease in net 
price) will result in increased enrollment (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). A number of 
existing studies examined the relationship of financial aid and enrollment. The literature 
in this section is grouped by the substantial literature reviews of Leslie and Brinkman 
(1987), Heller (1997), and Kim (2010). Finally, other related studies are considered. 
The Leslie and Brinkman (1987) Studies. 
Leslie and Brinkman ( 1987) performed a meta-analysis of 25 studies published 
between 1967 and 1982 examining enrollment demand in relation to price. The included 
studies analyzed data ranging from 1927 to 1976. In order to establish a common unit for 
the meta-analysis, all price elasticity measures were converted into a student price 
response coefficient (SPRC), which is the equivalent ofPE I $100 price change. In other 
words, the SPRC represents the effect on enrollment based on a $100 tuition increase. 
For the included studies, the SPRC averaged 0.7, indicating that a $100 tuition increase 
would yield a 0.7 percent decline in enrollment (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). The specific 
SPRC for the included studies ranged from 0.2 to 2.4. 
The methodology of Leslie and Brinkman (1987) improved upon previous 
attempts at a standardized elasticity value. In 1975, Jackson and Weathersby analyzed 
seven studies, fmding that a $100 increase in tuition would yield a one percent decline in 
enrollment by traditional college-age students. The SPRC values for the seven included 
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studies ranged from 0.6 to 1.9. Though Jackson and Weathersby (1975) became widely 
utilized, several methodological errors in conversions and a failure to adjust for the 
population studied weaken the results (Chisolm & Cohen, 1982; Leslie & Brinkman, 
1987). Given its methodological improvements over Jackson and Weathersby (1975), 
Leslie and Brinkman (1987) became the seminal work in the area to that time. 
Several of Leslie and Brinkman's (1987) findings are relevant to institutional aid 
policies. First, grant aid is more effective in encouraging enrollment than other forms of 
aid. Second, reported elasticities are likely inflated due to a focus on enrolling freshmen, 
who are expected to be more sensitive to price in comparison to enrolled upperclassmen. 
Third, institutions should focus on the effect of price elasticity on collected tuition 
revenue. Finally, the positive effect of reducing tuition will be greater than the negative 
effect of increasing tuition. This finding, drawn from the aggregate data, has not always 
held true in application as previously discussed in regard to colleges moving to a low 
tuition, low aid pricing model. 
Institutional differences, including price level, student body characteristics, 
financial aid, applicant pools, and competitors, create the possibility for wide variance 
from aggregate results (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Institutions should, therefore, be 
mindful of their own price elasticity and the impact on tuition revenue. A price elasticity 
less than one indicates a tuition increase will yield a revenue increase, however, a price 
elasticity of greater than one indicates a tuition increase will actually yield a reduction in 
revenue due to an enrollment decline (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). 
In regard to the individual nature of a college's place in the overall higher 
education market, Leslie and Brinkman (1987) concluded, "Demand is known to be 
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affected not only by price but by the money income of the buyer, by tastes and 
preferences, and by the value of the good from a consumption or an investment 
perspective" (p. 200). This conclusion noted individual preference remains an important 
consideration in enrollment decisions beyond cost. The individual nature of college 
choice is discussed in a following section. 
The Heller (1997) Studies. 
In 1997, Heller examined studies using more recent data in Student Price 
Response: An Update to Leslie and Brinkman. The data included in the Leslie and 
Brinkman (1987) studies stopped in 1976 before the rapid rise in real cost of tuition in the 
1980s. In total, Heller (1997) included 20 studies published after Leslie and Brinkman's 
(1987) analysis. These studies yielded SPRC values ranging from 0.5 to 1.0, which is 
consistent with the average (0. 7) and modal (0.6) values reported by Leslie and Brinkman 
(1987). 
Thus, price elasticity for higher education overall remained relatively unchanged 
in the data analyzed by the studies included in Heller (1997) as compared to Leslie and 
Brinkman (1987). However, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 may have 
affected price elasticity as prospective students are more aware of and concerned with 
tuition price (National Bureau of Economic Research, 2010). This dissertation focuses 
on private baccalaureate colleges, a relatively expensive sector of higher education that 
may prove susceptible to increasing price elasticity of demand. 
Several of the studies included in Heller (1997) directly examine the impact of 
financial aid on enrollment. In a study combining two-year and four-year, public and 
private institutions, St. John (1990) calculated a 2.8 percent enrollment decline from a 
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$1,000 tuition increase. The lower price sensitivity in St. John (1990) most likely 
resulted from controlling for financial aid, which lessens the net tuition cost to a student 
from an increase in published tuition (Heller, 1997). St. John (1990) also concluded that 
financial aid, in any form, is at least as effective in encouraging enrollment as a 
corresponding decrease in tuition. In a study oflower-income white students from 1974 
to 1984, McPherson and Shapiro (1991) found a $100 increase in financial aid 
corresponded to a 0. 7% increase in enrollment. The exact opposite effect resulted from a 
$100 increase in net tuition (McPherson & Shapiro, 1991). In a study of Occidental 
College, described as a selective college in California, a $1 ,000 increase in financial aid 
yielded a 7.8% increase in a student's probability of enrollment (Moore, Studenmund, & 
Slobko, 1991 ). Heller (1997) concluded cross-sectional longitudinal studies offer strong 
evidence that fmancial aid affects students' enrollment decisions. For the current study, 
this would suggest that higher levels of tuition discounting positively influence college 
enrollment choices by students. 
Overall, Heller (1997) drew many similar conclusions to Leslie and Brinkman 
(1987). Both analyses found consistent SPRC values. Several of Heller's (1997) other 
findings are relevant to institutional financial aid policies. First, financial aid packages 
do affect enrollment decisions. Second, lower-income students are particularly sensitive 
to tuition increases not offset by financial aid. Third, African-American students are 
more sensitive to price than White students. Finally, grants are the most effective form of 
financial aid to encourage enrollment. 
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The Kim (2010) Studies. 
Just as Heller (1997) provided an update to Leslie and Brinkman (1987), Kim 
(20 1 0) provided an update to Heller, though without calculating SPRC values. Several of 
the studies included in Kim's (2010) research focused on private colleges, which is 
highly relevant to this dissertation on private baccalaureate colleges. 
In a study of 82 selective liberal arts colleges providing data to the Higher 
Education Data Sharing Consortium from 1988 to 1990, Parker and Summers (1993) 
found increasing tuition significantly discouraged enrollment by both accepted full-pay 
and aided applicants. Highly ranked colleges with substantial non-tuition revenues such 
as endowments attracted a greater percentage of enrollment decisions. In contrast to the 
prevailing trend in the literature, Parker and Summers (1993) did not fmd a significant 
effect of financial aid on enrollment decisions by accepted applicants. The selective 
nature and perceived quality of the included colleges may have led to enrollment 
regardless of financial aid, though Kim (2010) also suggested the limited timeframe may 
have produced this result. Though published in 1993, Heller (1997) did not include this 
study. 
Buss, Parker, and Rivenburg (2004) expanded the timeframe considered by 
Parker and Summers (1993) in a study of 102 selective liberal arts colleges from 1988 to 
1998. This study found a significant effect of both grants and loans on enrollment 
decisions with grants (0.31) more effective than loans (0.12). Buss et al. (2004) also 
found aid recipients (1.27) were twice as sensitive to price as full-pay students (0.60). 
According to those figures, demand was inelastic among full-pay students and elastic 
among aided students. This result is particularly noteworthy to the dissertation at hand, 
which considers the relationship of price elasticity of full-pay and aided students to 
unfunded institutional aid. 
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Buss et al.. (2004) then applied their findings to Benchmark College, a fictional 
institution with a total price of $17,500. Benchmark must admit 1,000 full-pay students 
to enroll its target of 250 (25% yield) and 625 aided students ( 40% yield) with an average 
financial aid package of $7,500 in grants and $3,000 in loans to enroll its target of 250 
(500 total entering students). If Benchmark were to raise tuition by $1,000, it would 
enroll 10 less full-pay students and 17 fewer aided students. In order to reach the 
enrollment target of 250 of each type of student without adjusting financial aid awards, 
Benchmark must admit 43 more full-pay and 45 more aided applicants. If Benchmark 
merely raised financial aid packages by an equal percentage as the $1,000 tuition hike 
(5.7%), it would still have to admit 29 more aided students to reach the enrollment goal. 
The hypothetical example of Benchmark College provided by Buss et al. (2004) 
demonstrates how changes in tuition price affect both financial aid and selectivity, which 
relates directly to Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college. Desired enrollment 
level and price are linked in the model. As price increases, enrollment declines without 
additional effort to recruit potential students or accepting more applicants than previous 
quality standards allowed. 
In a study of a private, church-affiliated college from 1959 to 1993, Allen and 
Shen (1999) calculated a net price elasticity of 1.53, which indicates elastic demand. 
Allen and Shen (1999) also found a cross-price elasticity of 1.09 with another private 
comprehensive college in the region, indicating that prospective students viewed this 
institution as a comparable substitute and were sensitive to its prices as well. Neither a 
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neighboring public regional university nor a public doctoral university were viewed as a 
comparable substitute based on cross-price elasticity. Allen and Shen's (1999) results 
demonstrated the possible difference in elasticity between an individual institution and 
the prevailing inelastic demand for higher education overall as well as the price 
competition among comparable institutions. 
Hsing and Chang (1996) studied enrollments at private colleges and universities 
from 1964 to 1991, finding that price elasticity doubled from 0.261 to 0.557 during the 
period. This finding suggests that prospective students became increasingly sensitive to 
price over time. Kim (20 1 0) was critical of this study's lack of consideration of financial 
aid, though Hsing and Chang suggested the result could point to public institutions being 
increasingly considered comparable substitutes for a private college or university. 
Beyond the work focusing on private colleges, DesJardins et al. (2006) found 
"students who receive less aid than expected were less likely to enroll than students who 
receive aid in excess of their expectations" in a study of admissions data from the 
University oflowa from 1997 to 2002 (p. 412). This finding adds another level of 
consideration in institutional financial aid. Whereas other studies identify fmancial aid 
factors encouraging enrollment, DesJardins et al. (2006) demonstrated that merely 
disappointing expectations of financial aid can actually discourage enrollment. 
These studies demonstrate the importance of price and financial aid to enrollment 
at private liberal arts colleges, which is particularly relevant to this dissertation on private 
baccalaureate colleges (Kim, 2010). Like Leslie and Brinkman (1987), Kim (2010) 
encouraged an institution to consider its individual price elasticity when setting tuition 
and financial aid policies. Kim (2010) concluded, "To survive in this competitive higher 
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education market, institutions should actively utilize price mechanisms to recruit students 
with higher academic credentials and increase their institutional net revenues" (p. 42). 
This statement is a direct endorsement of tuition discounting, though the goals of 
increasing quality and increasing revenue can conflict (Archibald & Feldman, 2008). 
Other studies. 
The work of Leslie and Brinkman (1987), Heller (1997), and Kim (2010) provide 
a thorough review of studies examining the effect of financial aid on enrollment. Three 
additional studies not included in those works offer strong contributions to understanding 
the relationship of financial aid and enrollment decisions. Two of the studies analyzed 
data from large, public universities and one considered demand elasticity among enrolled 
students at a private college. 
In a study of admissions data from the University of Oregon from 2000 to 2005, 
Curs and Singell (20 1 0) found price responsiveness varied based on ability and need 
groupings. Less able students with more need were less responsive to price than more 
qualified students of means. Though the data comes from a very different institution than 
the focus of this dissertation, the differences in price responsiveness among groups based 
on means and qualification is noteworthy. The finding that highly qualified, wealthy 
students are most sensitive to price illustrates the competition within higher education for 
this group. These students have, and are aware of, options for enrollment. 
Singell and Stone (2002) also examined University of Oregon admissions data, 
but from an earlier period (1995 to 2000). This study found non-need-based fmancial aid 
encouraged enrollment in the university, particularly among students of means compared 
to students with need. This fmding supports the rationale for providing discounted tuition 
to students of means. Singell and Stone's (2002) study suggested providing these aid 
packages encourages enrollment of students capable of paying a higher percentage of 
published tuition thereby boosting an institution's net tuition revenue. 
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Previous reviews noted that price elasticity studies tend to focus on enrolling 
freshmen, who are expected to be more sensitive to price than enrolled students (Heller, 
1997; Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Bryan and Whipple (1995) found this to be true when 
analyzing data from a private liberal arts college. Current students demonstrated 
sufficiently inelastic demand to allow for increased tuition without reducing enrollment. 
Bryan and Whipple's (1995) model predicted up to a 16.9% tuition increase would not 
adversely affect the existing enrollment. This finding suggests private baccalaureate 
colleges can raise tuition in the attempt to maximize net tuition revenue without losing 
enrolled students. This fmding also supports the discount rates in NACUBO (20 11 ), 
which reported that discounting is lower among all students than first-time, full-time 
undergraduates (see Figure 2). In combination, NACUBO (2011) and Bryan and 
Whipple ( 1995) suggest a college should be most concerned with the price elasticity of 
incoming rather than existing students when setting tuition price. 
Models of Student Choice 
DesJardins, Ahlburg, and McCall (2006) thoroughly reviewed the literature 
related to modeling student choice. In sum, DesJardins et al. (2006) found most models 
use a three-stage process of aspiration, search, and choice (Davis-Van Atta & Carrier, 
1986; Hanson & Litten, 1982; Hossler, Braxton, & Coopersmith, 1989; Hossler & 
Gallagher, 1987; Jackson, 1982). 
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In the first stage, a student develops the general aspiration to attend college. 
These aspirations can begin in early childhood, develop over an extended period, and 
culminate in the selection of high school courses preparing the student for college 
enrollment. In order to enroll in a college, a student must first desire to attend higher 
education and lay the groundwork for a successful application. In the second stage, a 
student searches for colleges to possibly attend, including identification and application 
to college(s). During this stage, the student gathers information from a variety of formal 
and informal sources, takes appropriate tests such as the SAT, and applies to college(s). 
In the third stage, a student chooses a college in which to enroll. This stage includes 
admission and enrollment in a specific college. As DesJardins et al. (2006) noted, most 
enrollment demand studies focus in this area, which can neglect the early phases of the 
student's choice. In addressing matriculation decisions, Nurnberg, Schapiro, and 
Zimmerman (2010) offered a model that includes personal preference as a component. 
This preference factor acknowledges the individual nature of enrollment decisions. 
The enrollment studies previously cited and the student choice models reviewed 
by DesJardins et al. (2006) generally examined enrollment choices through aggregate 
data, however, these college decisions are highly individualized. Prospective students do 
not always choose a college based on rational economic factors (Heller, 1997). As 
Numberg et al. (20 1 0) concluded, 
.. .it should be noted that even with the presence of an extensive range of 
explanatory variables, much of the total variation in matriculation decisions 
remains unexplained. Perhaps it is the weather on preview day, or the 
attractiveness of the tour guide that attracts or repels a prospective student. (p. 22) 
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Beyond the weather or a tour guide's appearance, a myriad of factors could possibly 
influence the personal preference of a prospective student. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to engage the individual nature of enrollment decisions, though this nature must be 
acknowledged. 
Tuition Discounting in Higher Education 
The literature directly focused on tuition discounting is organized into two 
categories: general tuition discounting studies and tuition discounting outcomes/effects 
(Ruterbusch, 2004). Within general tuition discounting studies, much of the work centers 
on the annual NACUBO Tuition Discounting Survey. The literature on outcomes and 
effects of tuition discounting, in comparison, represents an array of sampling, data 
sources, and lines of research. 
General Tuition Discounting Literature 
The general literature on tuition discounting focused on reporting discount rate 
trends. The annual NACUBO Tuition Discounting Survey is a common source for many 
of the studies, though the College Board published an independent report in 2010 (Baum 
et al., 201 0). Each report relied on compiled responses to separate surveys. Though 
reporting similar results in general, differences arise based on the particular dataset. 
The NACUBO Tuition Discounting Survey. 
The National Association of College and University Business Officers annually 
surveys member institutions on tuition discounting and institutional aid. In 2010, the 
survey drew viable responses from 381 private colleges and universities (NACUBO, 
2011). The report analyzed the total sample as well as three subcategories: small 
institutions, defined as those with enrollments less than 4,000 students and generally 
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awarding bachelor's and master's degrees; comprehensive/doctoral institutions, defined 
as those with enrollments greater than 4,000 students granting master's and possibly 
doctoral degrees; and research universities, defined as "doctoral degree granting research 
universities" (NACUBO, 2011, p. 24). Of the total2010 sample, small institutions 
comprised 79.5%, comprehensive/doctoral institutions comprised 12.9%, and research 
universities comprised 7.6%. By Carnegie classification, special focus institutions 
represent only 5.5% of the NACUBO sample compared to 36.0% of all private, not-for-
profit institutions (NACUBO, 2011; U.S. Department of Education, 2011b). 
Baccalaureate colleges (44.9% of the sample versus 33.3% of the population), master's 
institutions (36.3% versus 23.8%), and doctoral research universities (13.4% versus 
6.8%) were, therefore, overrepresented in the NACUBO sample compared to the 
population. 
The number ofNACUBO respondents increased every year since 2000, more than 
doubling the sample size from 154 responding institutions to 381 in 2010. Even with the 
growth in response numbers, the sample size leaves room for critique. Duggan and 
Matthews (2005) described the NACUBO reports as "interesting as an overview of 
tuition discounting," but "oflimited utility'' based on the sample size (p. 45). In 2005, 
roughly 19% of the more than 1,800 private four-year institutions listed in Integrated 
Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) participated in the NACUBO survey. 
Duggan and Matthews (2005) advocated using the more comprehensive data available 
through IPEDS to analyze and compare tuition discount rates. IPEDS can also provide 
continuous data for an institution over a number of years, whereas the NACUBO survey 
readily acknowledged attrition as an issue. Within the NACUBO sample, only 143 
institutions (37.5% of2010 sample) provided three consecutive years of response data 
with just 94 (24.8% of2010 sample) responding for 10 consecutive years. 
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Another limitation of the NACUBO survey is the reporting of a single discounting 
rate, the scholarship allowance, without distinguishing between funded and unfunded 
institutional aid. The scholarship allowance, called the average discount rate in the 
NACUBO report, is calculated as total institutional grants (both funded and unfunded 
aid) divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees (Allan, 2007). Unfunded aid represents 
the greatest concern to colleges and universities, yet little effort was made to distinguish 
this type of aid in the NACUBO report (Breneman, 1994; Martin, 2004). 
Despite these limitations, the NACUBO survey is helpful as a general tool to 
track movements in discount rates, institutional fmancial aid, and net tuition revenue. In 
2010, the average discount rate to first-time, full-time freshmen (42.4%) and all 
undergraduates (37.1 %) reached unprecedented levels. The percentage of enrolling 
students receiving institutional aid jumped substantially from 2008 to 2009, which 
NACUBO attributed to the economic recession. This percentage was expected to hold 
steady in 2010. After a small decline in 2008 (-0.3%), the responding institutions saw 
modest gains in net tuition revenue in 2009 (1.8%) and 2010 (2.8%) despite the increases 
in discount rates. 
Figure 9 shows the average discount rates for first-time, full-time freshmen by 
institutional type from 2000 to 2010 according to the NACUBO survey results. Clearly 
small institutions, which discounted tuition by 43.7% in 2010, offered greater discounts 
than comprehensive/doctoral institutions (36.6%) or research universities (38.7%). This 
relationship has been consistent for more than a decade. 
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Figure 9. Average discount rates to first-time, full-time freshmen by institutional type, 
2000-2010. Adapted from the 2010 Tuition Discounting Study Report by the National 
Association of College and University Business Officers, 2011. 
Figure 10 shows the percentage of first-time, full-time freshmen receiving 
institutional grants by institutional type from 2000 to 2010 according to the NACUBO 
survey results. Again, small institutions clearly awarded institutional aid to a higher 
percentage of enrolling students than the other categories. In 2010, more than 90% of 
enrolling students received institutional aid at small institutions. The NACUBO study 
did not directly distinguish between funded and unfunded aid in these financial aid 
packages. 
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Figure 10. Percentage of first-time, full-time freshmen receiving institutional grants by 
institutional type, 2000-2010. Adapted from the 2010 Tuition Discounting Study Report 
by the National Association of College and University Business Officers, 2011. 
Analyses Related to the NACUBO Tuition Discounting Study. 
NACUBO first began the tuition discounting study in 1994. At that time, concern 
was growing over increasing discount rates. Jenny (1997) argued that discounts should 
be offered to maximize net tuition revenue, but warned that providing institutional grants 
to more than half of enrolling students signals a point of no return. Once 7 5% or more of 
students receive institutional aid, the process becomes self-defeating (Jenny (1997). The 
average percentage of first-time, full-time freshmen at small institutions receiving 
institutional aid was more than 90% in 2010 (NACUBO, 2011). The number of colleges 
providing institutional aid to the overwhelming majority of incoming freshmen increased 
dramatically since the start of the NACUBO survey. In 1990, just more than 14% of 
respondents provided aid to more than 90% of incoming freshmen. By 1999, this 
percentage increased to 43.3% of respondents (Lapovsky & Hubbell, 2000). 
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In an analysis of the 1998 NACUBO study, Lapovsky (1999) found only two 
respondents, or 0.5% of the sample, reported net tuition revenues equal to published 
tuition, meaning these institutions offered no discounts. In considering changes to tuition 
price, Lapovsky (1999) reported five of the six colleges cutting tuition between 1997 and 
1998 suffered a drop in net tuition revenue. At institutions increasing tuition from 1997 
to 1998, nearly a quarter reported less net tuition revenue. These declines suggest these 
institutions had price elasticities greater than one, a situation requiring more institutional 
aid be distributed when tuition rises merely to meet enrolment goals. Overall, 
Lapovsky's (1999) fmdings were consistent with other work in the literature, namely 
Leslie and Brinkman (1987). Colleges considering cutting tuition should exercise great 
care and anticipate a period of reduced tuition revenues during implementation. Colleges 
considering raising tuition should monitor individual price elasticity to ensure such a 
move will not lead to a net tuition revenue decline. 
Institutions with low to moderate endowment values must increasingly offer 
greater tuition discounts to meet enrollment goals. Endowment value is highly correlated 
with top U.S. News & World Report rankings and higher tuition (Hubbell & Lapovsky, 
2005). As suggested by the Chivas Regal effect, the demand for these institutions 
requires less financial aid to meet enrollment goals. In 2000, Lapovsky and Hubbell 
noted institutions with endowments greater than $100 million offer less institutional aid. 
The situation is one "in which institutional wealth begets institutional wealth with overall 
lower rates of discount, fewer students aided, and higher average aid levels offsetting 
higher tuition levels for the aided students" (Hubbell & Lapovsky, 2005, "Prestige and 
Money Matter," para. 1). As a result, colleges with aspirations beyond their wealth are 
squeezed. In 2005, the highest tuition discount rates ( 40.1%) were at institutions with 
endowments from $10.1 million to $25 million. Similar discount rates are listed for 
endowment values ranging from $25.1 million to $50 million (39.1 %), $50.1 million to 
$100 million (38.8%), and $101 million to $500 million (38.1%). The poorest (32.7%) 
and wealthiest institutions (34.5%) in terms of endowment discounted tuition the least 
(Hubbell & Lapovsky, 2005). In sum, Lapovsky and Hubbell (2000) and Hubbell and 
Lapovsky (2005) supported the existence of a Chi vas Regal effect among selective, 
wealthy institutions, but find that colleges aspiring to that status must provide greater 
levels of financial aid to meet enrollment goals. 
The 2010 College Board Tuition Discounting Study. 
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In a 2010 report, Baum et al. analyzed institutional data reported directly to the 
College Board from 2000 to 2009 through its Annual Survey of Colleges. At least 474 
private, four-year institutions responded in any year with an average of 687 in each year 
of the nine-year period. The College Board sample is substantially larger than the 
number of respondents to the NACUBO survey. Baum et al. (20 1 0), like the NACUBO 
report, defined the tuition discount rate as the scholarship allowance, which is total 
institutional grants divided by gross tuition and mandatory fees (Allan, 2007). In 
addition to the larger sample, another advantage of this report is the more nuanced data 
provided to the College Board, allowing for more analysis of discounting within various 
categories. 
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Table 3 
Discount Rates by Institutional Category (in %), 2007-2008 
Percentile 
Mean lOth 25th Median 75th 90th 
Public, Two-Year 12.6 0.7 2.6 7.4 17.6 27.7 
Public, Four-Year 17.6 4.0 9.0 15.6 24.4 33.6 
Private, Four-Year 32.8 17.6 24.8 33.6 41.1 47.0 
Note. Adapted from Tuition Discounting: Institutional Aid Patterns at Public and 
Private Colleges and Universities, 2000-2001 to 2008-2009 by Baum, Lapovsky, & Ma, 
2010, p. 6. 
Table 3 shows the differences in discount rates for the 2007-2008 academic year. 
Baum et al. (20 1 0) found that discount rates for public institutions were relatively stable 
from 2000 to 2009. Discount rates at private institutions continued to rise during the 
period and were substantially greater than either public two-year or four-year institutions. 
Baum et al. 's (2010) analysis of discount rates by tuition quartiles echoed the 
discounting squeeze by endowment noted in Hubbell and Lapovsky (2005). In the 2007-
2008 academic year, the least expensive institutions (fourth quartile) also discounted the 
least (25.3%). Though the top three quartiles discount within a relatively small range, the 
third quartile discounts the most (34.2%) followed by the second quartile (33.8%) and the 
highest quartile (32.6%). Price elasticity likely accounts for at least some of this squeeze, 
as institutions in the second and third quartile likely face more elastic demand than the 
most expensive quartile. Those institutions must then provide greater discounts to meet 
enrollment goals. 
Baum et al. (2010) found different results than Hubbell and Lapovsky (2005) in 
regard to the relationship of endowment value to discount rate. Whereas Hubbell and 
Lapovsky (2005) analyzed discount rates based on the total endowment value, Baum et 
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al. (2010) used endowment per full-time equivalent (FTE). Using this method, discount 
rates are highest at institutions with $500,000 or more in endowment per FTE at 36.8% in 
the 2007-2008 academic year. Though institutions with $50,000 to $199,999 in 
endowment per FTE (34.4%) discounted slightly more than those with $200,000 to 
$499,999 in endowment per FTE (34.0%), discount rates generally increased along with 
endowment per FTE. This finding suggests that wealthier institutions are more capable 
of offering tuition discounts, possibly through the availability of more funded 
institutional aid. Baum et al. (2010) noted a close correlation of endowment value per 
FTE and published tuition price, so the possibility exists that less endowed institutions 
reach a net price comparable to the wealthiest institutions despite lower discount rates. 
Other fmdings applicable to this dissertation include that baccalaureate colleges 
discounted at higher rates than master's or doctoral-granting institutions and discount 
rates peak at institutions with middling SAT scores (1100 to 1149) while declining at 
institutions with higher average scores (Baum et al., 2010). In regard to SAT scores, 
Baum et al. (20 1 0) supported the conclusion that colleges in the middle must discount 
more to attract students. 
Overall, the Baum et al. (2010) report is likely more accurate than NACUBO 
(2011) as it is based on a much larger sample size. The advantage ofthe NACUBO 
survey is annual reports with historical data for nearly two decades. The Duggan and 
Matthews (2005) critique of the NACUBO survey also applies to Baum et al. (2010). A 
common disadvantage of both the NACUBO survey and Baum et al. (2010) is the limited 
reporting of unfunded institutional discount rate, which represents foregone tuition 
revenue and is of greater concern to colleges than the funded institutional discount rate 
(Breneman, 1994; Martin, 2004). Using !PEDS data, as in this dissertation, allows 
analysis of discount rates of the entire population of targeted institutions as well as the 
ability to distinguish between funded and unfunded institutional aid. 
Outcomes and Effects of Tuition Discounting 
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In a study of tuition discounting in the aggregate and on the institutional level, 
Davis (2003) found discounting tuition included several unintended consequences, 
including reducing affordability and choice of low-income students. From 1995 to 1999, 
institutional aid more than doubled for the wealthiest students at private colleges and 
universities compared to more modest gains for less wealthy students. The percentage of 
institutional aid awarded to students whose families earn $40,000 or less declined by 
16.0% during this period (Davis, 2003). Acknowledging discounting may yield positive 
results at individual institutions, Davis (2003) found discounting tuition often results in 
less net tuition revenue and minimal, if any, gains in average SAT scores. This finding 
suggests that institutions may be discounting merely to reach the desired enrollment 
level, a stage one decision in Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college. 
Redd (2000) reached similar conclusions to Davis (2003). Institutions increasing 
grants the most from 1989 to 1996 faced declining tuition revenue. From 1990 to 1998, 
the average SAT scores at institutions with the greatest increases in discount rates grew 
less than at institutions with the least increases. In combination, Davis (2003) and Redd 
(2000) suggested that tuition discounts may actually harm the student profile and net 
tuition revenue of an institution. Neither study focused on institutional demand and its 
effect on discounting, which limits the analysis to a more general level. 
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In a study of baccalaureate colleges in Pennsylvania, Griffith (1996) found 
colleges with the lowest discount rates reaped the greatest gains in net tuition revenue as 
well as the greatest gains in enrollment from 1987 to 1993. This study did consider price 
elasticity of demand, concluding elastic demand resulted in the lower net tuition revenue. 
Griffith (1996) concluded increasing discount rates can erode the financial health of a 
college, a fmding supported by Browning (2011). In analyzing the relationship of 
discounting to fmancial stability as measured by financial ratios not considering 
endowment value, Browning (2011) found less financially stable institutions discounted 
more than other more stable peers, indicating a college struggling financially may 
compound its difficulties through excessive discounting. This dissertation builds on these 
studies by examining the relationship of price elasticity to unfunded institutional aid. 
Ruterbusch (2004) examined tuition discounting at private baccalaureate colleges 
between 1990 and 2000, finding discounting increased for this population by seven 
percentage points in the decade, smaller and less prestigious colleges discounted the 
most, and tuition discounting negatively affected net tuition revenue. These findings are 
highly relevant to this study since the population is generally the same. Though the 
targeted institutions are similar, this study differs in the focus of analysis by examining 
the relationship of price elasticity of demand, which was not a component of 
Ruterbusch's (2004) study, on unfunded institutional aid. This dissertation also examines 
more recent data. As Ruterbusch (2004) acknowledged, a change in the IPEDS reporting 
definition in 1997 appeared to confuse colleges, possibly affecting the accuracy of the 
reported data. Whereas this change fell in the middle of study period for Ruterbusch 
(2004), this dissertation should benefit from consistent reporting requests from 2000 to 
2009. Despite different foci of analysis, this dissertation shares a common target 
population with Ruterbusch (2004) and benefits from data expected to be more reliably 
accurate in the reporting done to IPEDS by the individual institutions. 
Summary 
64 
Breneman's (1994) theory of the private college holds that institutions make 
enrollment decisions in two stages. The first stage establishes an operational pattern 
based on desired enrollment, fixed inputs to support the enrollment, and tuition price 
necessary to support the enrollment. The second stage seeks to maximize both student 
quality and the quality of the fixed inputs. Tuition discounting decisions can be made in 
either of these stages based on the demand for enrollment. 
Price and cost are inextricably linked in higher education. Two theories, cost 
disease theory and the revenue theory of costs, explain the continually rising costs in 
higher education. According to cost disease, the wages for skilled labor rise in response 
to inflation in the general economy, an external force, rather than gains in productivity 
(Baumol & Bowen, 1966). Subsequent studies found evidence that the cost of skilled 
labor in higher education drove the spiraling tuition rates (Archibald & Feldman, 2008; 
Trombella, 2011 ). According to the revenue theory of costs, the rising costs in higher 
education result from an insatiable institutional desire for more funds, an internal force. 
Available revenue is, therefore, the only constraint on spending (Bowen, 1980). An 
analysis of siniultaneous growth in external financial aid and tuition rates supported the 
revenue theory of costs (Martin & Gillen, 2011 ). 
Pricing tuition is also a strategy unto itself. Two contrasting models, high tuition-
high aid and low tuition-low aid, are most frequently used (Hillman, 2010). In both, 
tuition and financial aid are established in an effort to provide sufficient net tuition 
revenue to cover an institution's expenses. The Chivas Regal effect supports higher 
tuition since price is associated with quality (Martin, 2011). Colleges adopting a low 
tuition-low aid model have found mixed results, suggesting the outcomes are based on 
individual circumstances. 
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The literature on enrollment holds that demand for higher education is generally 
inelastic, though an individual institution should monitor its own elasticity in making 
pricing and financial aid decisions (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). A number of studies 
concluded financial aid encouraged enrollment on both an aggregate and institutional 
basis. Financial aid packages can be used as a tool to encourage enrollment, a 
fundamental premise of discounting tuition. 
Studies of tuition discounting found its consequences can be, and often are, 
negative, including reduced net tuition revenue, limited gains in student quality, and 
limited gains in enrollment. These studies generally reported the scholarship allowance, 
which considers all institutional aid and overlooks the particular concern to colleges 
posed by unfunded institutional aid. Studies based on independent surveys also limit 
generalizability by not using the more comprehensive data available through IPEDS. 
This dissertation builds on the existing literature by focusing on the relationship 
of price elasticity of demand to unfunded institutional aid, a topic yet to be examined. 
Previous studies suggest that more elastic demand should increase the levels of unfunded 
institutional aid. If such a relationship is found, it suggests that tuition discounting 
reflects increasingly elastic demand for private baccalaureate colleges, which holds 
greater consequences on institutional financial health than lost net revenue in a given 
year. Using the comprehensive IPEDS dataset, the sample under study closely 
approximates a population study. 
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Chapter Three: Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of tuition discounting on 
institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at private 
baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. This chapter describes the quantitative 
methodology applied in this pursuit. Multiple regressions will be used to examine the 
relationship of price elasticity for full-pay and aided students to unfunded institutional 
discounts. Repeated measures analyses of variance will be used to examine changes in 
the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional aid at private baccalaureate colleges during 
the period. 
Research Questions 
This study seeks to address the overarching question: What are the implications of 
unfunded institutional discount rates on institutional market strength at private 
baccalaureate colleges between 2000 and 2009? The following research sub-questions 
are pursued as well: 
1. What is the relationship of the tuition price elasticity of demand for full-pay and aided 
students to the unfunded institutional discount rate? 
The research hypothesis (H1) is: Elastic demand by either or both full-pay and 
aided students is significantly related to the unfunded institutional discount rate. The 
accompanying null hypothesis (H0) is: No statistically significant relationship exists 
between elastic demand by either full-pay or aided students and unfunded institutional 
discount rate. 
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2. Given the outcome of Question 1, what is the relationship of the price elasticity of 
demand for full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate 
based on admissions selectivity? 
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The research hypothesis (H2) is: The relationship of elastic demand by either or 
both full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate differs 
significantly based on admissions selectivity. The accompanying null hypothesis (H0) is: 
There is no statistically significant difference based on admissions selectivity in the 
relationship of elastic demand by either or both full-pay and aided students to the 
unfunded institutional discount rate. 
3. How, if at all, has the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 affected the ratio of 
funded and unfunded institutional discount rates? 
The research hypothesis (H3) is: A significant change in the ratio of funded and 
unfunded institutional discount rates followed the economic recession from 2007 to 2009. 
The accompanying null hypothesis (H0) is: There is no significant change in the ratio of 
funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the economic recession from 
2007 to 2009. 
4. Given the outcome of Question 3, how, if at all, has the economic recession from 
2007 to 2009 affected the balance of funded and unfunded institutional aid based on 
endowment? 
The research hypothesis (Ii4) is: The change in the ratio of funded and unfunded 
institutional discount rates following the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 differs 
significantly based on endowment value. The accompanying null hypothesis (Ho) is: 
There is no significant difference based on endowment value in the shift in the ratio of 
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funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the economic recession from 
2007 to 2009. 
Selection of Quantitative Methodology 
Quantitative research is appropriate to examine relationships among numerical 
variables (Creswell, 2009). In particular, this methodology is appropriate when questions 
involve investigation into understanding how and to what extent variables impact 
outcomes. This study examines relationships among numerical variables at multiple 
private baccalaureate colleges over a 10-year period, so quantitative methodology is 
appropriate. Much of the research reviewed in chapter two applied similar approaches. 
Thus, applying quantitative analyses in this study helps to place it within the existing 
literature. 
Study Population and Sample 
This study focuses on private baccalaureate colleges, defmed as private, not-for-
profit, four-year institutions in the United States classified as baccalaureate by the 
Carnegie Foundation with exclusively undergraduate enrollment. The following steps 
were taken to identify the sample for analysis: 
1. Institutional control or affiliation reported to IPEDS as either "private, not-for-
profit (no religious affiliation)" or "private, not-for-profit (religious affiliation)" 
were included. In the !PEDS variable (ic2010.cntlaffi:VL-Institutional control or 
affiliation), institutions reporting values of"3" or "4" were included. 
2. Basic Carnegie classifications for 2010 reported to !PEDS as either 
"Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences" or "Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse 
Fields" were included. In the !PEDS variable (hd2010.ccbasic:VL-Carnegie 
Classification 2010: Basic), institutions reporting values of "21" or "22" were 
included. 
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3. Basic Carnegie classifications for 2005 reported to !PEDS as either 
"Baccalaureate Colleges--Arts & Sciences" or "Baccalaureate Colleges--Diverse 
Fields" were included. In the !PEDS variable (hd2009 _ ccbasic: VL-Camegie 
Classification 2005: Basic), institutions reporting values of "21" or "22" were 
included. 
4. Basic Carnegie classifications for 2000 reported to !PEDS as either 
"Baccalaureate Colleges--Liberal Arts" or "Baccalaureate Colleges--General" 
were included. In the !PEDS variable (hd2010.carnegie:VL-Carnegie 
Classification 2000), institutions reporting values of "31" or "32" were included. 
Requiring a designation as a baccalaureate college in 2000,2005, and 2010 
ensured an institution maintained the same Carnegie classification throughout the 
period of analysis. 
5. Enrollment profiles reported to !PEDS as "Exclusively undergraduate four-year" 
were included. In the !PEDS variable (hd2010.ccenrprf:VL-Carnegie 
Classification 2010: Enrollment Profile), institutions reporting values of"2" were 
included. 
A total of 178 colleges met these criteria for inclusion in the study. Following the 
. methodology ofRuterbusch (2004), colleges reporting zero dollars of unfunded 
institutional aid were removed from the sample. In such cases, the college either does not 
engage in tuition discounting through unfunded institutional aid or a repeated 
error/omission occurred in reporting. For this study, all colleges reporting zero dollars of 
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unfunded institutional aid in three or more of the 10 years in the period under study were 
eliminated from the sample. Applying this criterion eliminated 29 colleges, leaving a 
total of 149 remaining in the sample. In a limited review of the eliminated colleges based 
on endowment value and funded institutional aid, it appears a handful may not award 
unfunded institutional aid based on endowment value and the reported amount of funded 
institutional aid. The majority appear more likely to have erred or omitted data in 
reporting. In Appendix A, Table A1 lists the colleges included in the sample. Table A2 
lists the colleges removed and the reason(s) for removal. 
Within the 149 colleges remaining in the sample, a total of 14 reported zero 
dollars of unfunded institutional aid in one (nine colleges) or two (five colleges) of the 
years included in the 1 0-year period of analysis. In these cases, the zero value was 
deemed a reporting error, replaced with"." as a placeholder value, and treated as missing 
data. The corresponding year's funded aid was also eliminated in these instances. For 11 
of these 14 colleges, the reported funded aid in the year missing unfunded aid was greater 
than the adjacent year(s), including six colleges for which the reported funded aid was 
double the adjacent years. Eliminating the funded aid data, which appears to be 
erroneously reported, in these years ensures that the entire data year will be treated as 
missing data and not be included in the analysis. 
One fmal check was run to reduce the likelihood of including erroneously 
reported institutional data in the final dataset. The reported unfunded institutional aid 
was compared to the following year to identify instances in which the figure varied by 
more than 50%. Only two instances, representing 0.1% of the examined data points, 
were identified. In both instances, the amount of unfunded aid increased by more than 
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50% in the following year, establishing a new level that continued in subsequent years for 
those institutions. 
Data Sources 
All variables in the dataset were taken from the Integrated Postsecondary 
Education Data System (!PEDS), or derived from calculations performed with !PEDS 
variables. Administered by the U.S. Department of Education's National Center for 
Educational Statistics, !PEDS houses data gathered through a number of annual surveys 
for more than 6,700 institutions (U.S. Department of Education, 2011a). All institutions 
of higher education participating in federal student aid programs must report data on 
enrollments, finances, student financial aid, and tuition prices among other topical areas 
(U.S. Department ofEducation, 2011a). 
Limitations of the Data 
The data reported to !PEDS is unaudited, which leaves open the possibility of 
errors in reporting or even deliberate deception by an institution (Griffith, 1996; Stump, 
2001 ). The possibility of misunderstanding the exact data requested can lead to reporting 
errors in institutional submissions, particularly if a change in definition occurred 
(Ruterbusch, 2004). Unlike Ruterbusch (2004), definitions of institutional fmancial aid 
remained constant during this study's period of analysis, reducing the risk of 
misunderstanding on the part of institutional researchers reporting data. 
There are, however, reasons to be confident in the accuracy of !PEDS data. 
During data entry by the individual institutions, the system runs a number of error checks, 
including comparing entries across years and to the same request made in different 
sections (U.S. Department of Education, 2011a). Before locking any survey section, the 
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institutional researcher submitting data must respond to the error report generated by the 
institution. The person entering the data is asked to correct, confirm, or explain 
incongruent data before the system will lock the submission. Without addressing all 
errors in all section of the survey, resulting in a clean report, the competed survey cannot 
be submitted. 
Beyond the data checks during submission, comparative analysis with other 
datasets supports the accuracy of IPEDS. In a study using data from IPEDS, the U.S. 
News & World Report annual survey, the American Association of University Professors 
annual survey, citation indices from the Institute for Scientific Information, and data from 
various college guidebooks, Volkwein and Sweitzer (2006) found the IPEDS data to be 
"highly correlated" to other sources (p. 137). Schuh (2002) described IPEDS data as "a 
more readily accessible and comprehensive approach to accessing institutional 
data ... than other methods of data collection (pp. 29-30). Though the limitations of any 
unaudited, self-reported data must be acknowledged, IPEDS data is the foundation of this 
study and is arguably a vetted and valued source of data. 
The method of reporting of student fmancial aid also limits the dataset. IPEDS 
gathers the number of first-time, full-time undergraduates in a given year's fmancial aid 
cohort. As such, the calculations of price elasticity in this dissertation study are limited 
to enrolling freshmen. As Leslie and Brinkman (1987) noted, examining only enrolling 
freshmen can inflate the elasticity values. The bulk of studies on student price 
responsiveness share this limitation by focusing on enrolling traditional college-age 
students. 
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A final limitation of the data is the number of years available for certain variables. 
In an attempt to respond to the adapting needs for higher education data, IPEDS adds, 
and sometimes removes, the request for certain data from year to year. This dissertation 
study is directly limited by the availability of admissions data from 2001 to 2009 and the 
availability of endowment data from 2003 to 2009. Questions involving these variables 
must be adapted to reflect the data available. 
Description of Variables 
Table 4 below describes the variables analyzed in this study. All variables in the 
dataset were either taken directly from the IPEDS or derived from calculations with 
IPEDS variables. 
The calculation of price elasticity requires further explanation. As presented in 
chapter two, price elasticity (PE) measures "the responsiveness of demand to changes in 
price" (Arnold, 2008, p. 377). It is calculated as the ratio of percent change in quantity 
demanded (Qd) to percent change in price (P), or: 
PE = % change in quantity demanded 
% change in price 
In calculating price elasticities for full-pay and aided students, directly calculating the 
percentage change is ineffective due to fluctuations in enrollments (Hall & Lieberman, 
2006). These fluctuations do not necessarily indicate a change in demand, but do alter 
the outcome of this simplest calculation. Breneman's (1994) theory noted this possibility 
as enrollments vary within an acceptable range between lower and upper limits. 
In 1967, Campbell and Siegel used the ratio of enrolled students to the eligible 
population in their estimates of price response in higher education. Jackson and 
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Weathersby (1975) included that ratio in calculating price elasticity for higher education 
by the following formula: 
PE= 
A(E /P} 
(E/P) 
AC 
c 
where E is the enrollment, P is the eligible population, and C is the cost to students 
(tuition price). 
Applying the Jackson and Weathersby (1975) formula to this dissertation study, 
price elasticity for full-pay students (XFP) is calculated as follows: 
A(XFP /E) 
(Xpp/E) 
AP 
p 
where E stands for the college's enrolling cohort of students and P stands for the tuition 
price. The same formula is applied to calculate price elasticity for aided, or partial-pay, 
students (Xpp) with the substitution ofXpp for Xpp. This calculation controls for 
fluctuations in enrollment by considering the proportion of full-pay and aided students 
within the enrolling cohort rather than the absolute numbers. 
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Table 4 
Description of Variables 
Variable 
Year 
Institution 
PTE 
Enrollment 
Full-Pay 
Students 
(XFP) 
Aided 
Students 
(Xpp) 
Tuition and 
Fees (P) 
Average 
Aided 
Tuition (Paid) 
Price 
Elasticity 
(Full-Pay) 
Price 
Elasticity 
(Aided) 
Source/Calculation 
IPEDS (year), value from 1999 to 2009 
IPEDS (instnm) 
IPEDS (drvefYEAR_fte:VL-Full-time equivalent fall enrollment) 
Calculation: sfaYEAR.scugffn - sfaYEAR.igmt_ n 
Included Variables: IPEDS (sfaYEAR.scugffn:VL-Total number of full-
time first-time degree/certificate seeking undergraduates), IPEDS 
(sfaYEAR.igmt_ n:vl-number of full-time first-time undergraduates 
receiving institutional grant aid) 
IPEDS (sfaYEAR.igmt_ n:vl-number of full-time first-time 
undergraduates receiving institutional grant aid) 
Calculation: sfaYEAR.scugffn + icYEAR_ay_fee3 
Included Variables: IPEDS (icYEAR_ay.tuition3:vl-out-of-state average 
tuition for full-time undergraduates), IPEDS (icYEAR_ay_fee3:vl-out-of-
state undergraduate required fees) 
IPEDS (sfaYEAR.npgrn2:VL-Average net price-students receiving grant 
or scholarship aid- YEAR) 
Calculation: [((XFPyear2 I Eyear2)- (XFPyearl I Eyeart)) I (XFPyearl I Eyeart)] I 
((Pyear2- Pyeart) I Pyeart) 
Included Variables: full-pay students, tuition and fees, IPEDS 
(sfaYEAR.scugffn:VL-Total number of full-time first-time 
degree/ certificate seeking undergraduates) 
Calculation: [((XPPyear2/ Eyear2)- (XPPyearl I Eyeart)) I (XPPyearl I Eyeart)] I 
((P aid..year2 -Paid.. year I)/ P aid.year2) 
Included Variables: Aided students, average aided tuition, IPEDS 
(sfaYEAR.scugffn:VL-Total number of full-time first-time 
degree/ certificate seeking undergraduates) 
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Table 4 Cont' d 
Variable Source/Calculation 
Unfunded 
Institutional 
Discount 
Rate 
Calculation: [fYEAR_f2.f2c06/ (fYEAR_f2.f2d01 + fYEAR_f2.f2c08)] 
Included Variables: !PEDS (fYEAR_f2.f2c06:vl-institutional grants 
(unfunded)), !PEDS (fYEAR_f2.f2d01:vl-tuition and fees- total), !PEDS 
(fYEAR_f2.f2c08:vl-allowances applied to tuition and fees) 
Funded 
Institutional 
Discount 
Rate 
Admission 
Rate 
Endowment 
Value per 
FTE 
Calculation: [fYEAR_ f2.f2c05 I (fYEAR_f2.f2d01 + fYEAR_f2.f2c08)] 
Included Variables: !PEDS (fYEAR_ f2.f2c05:vl-institutional grants 
(funded)), !PEDS (fYEAR_f2.f2d01:vl-tuition and fees- total), !PEDS 
(fYEAR_f2.f2c08:vl-allowances applied to tuition and fees) 
Calculation: icYEAR.admssn I icYEAR.applcn 
Included Variables: !PEDS (icYEAR.applcn:VL-Applicants total), !PEDS 
(icYEAR.admssn:VL-Admissions total) 
Quartile Rank (derived from the calculation below) 
Calculation: A VERAGE[(f0405_f2.f2h01 I drvef0405.fte), 
(f0506_f2.f2h01 I drvef0506.fte), (f0607_f2.f2h01 I drvef0607.fte), 
(f0708_t2.t2h011 drvef0708.fte), (f0809 _t2.t2h01/ drvef0809.fte) 
Included Variables: !PEDS (fYEAR f2.f2h01 :vi-value of endowment 
assets at the beginning of the fiscal year), !PEDS (drvefYEAR.fte:VL-
Full-time equivalent fall enrollment) 
All four research questions consider variables over a 1 0-year period from 2000 to 
2009. In order to calculate the necessary variables in 2000, data from 1999 is used as a 
base year. Question 1 considers three variables: unfunded institutional discount rate, 
price elasticity of full-pay students, and price elasticity of aided students. Question 2 
considers the same three variables as Question 1 with the addition of admission 
selectivity. Question 3 considers two variables: funded institutional discount rate and 
unfunded institutional discount rate. Question 4 considers the same two variables as 
Question 3 as well as the variable for endowment per full-time equivalent. Table 5 shows 
the variables used in each question. 
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Table 5 
Included Variables by Question 
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 
Unfunded institutional discount rate (1,2,3,4) 
Price Elasticity of Full-Pay Students (1,2) 
Funded Institutional Discount Rate (3,4) 
Price Elasticity of Aided Students (1 ,2) 
Admissions Endowment per 
Selectivity (2) FTE (4) 
Methods of Analysis 
Two statistical procedures will be applied to the data to answer individual 
questions. Multiple regressions will be used for Questions 1 and 2. Repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be used for Question 3 and Question 4. 
Method Applied to Question 1 
Question 1 seeks to determine the relationship between the unfunded institutional 
discount rate (dependent variable) and price elasticity of full-pay and aided students 
(independent variables). These variables will be subjected to multiple regression analysis 
in ffiM SPSS (Version 19.0) using the equation model: 
(1) 
where Du represents the unfunded institutional discount rate in a given year, PEFP 
represents the price elasticity of full-pay students, PEpp represents the price elasticity of 
aided students, P represent the respective regression coefficients, and c represents the 
intercept value. This method will be repeated for each of the 1 0 years from 2000 to 2009 
and the resulting models compared for stability over time. 
Multiple regression analysis "shows the influence of two or more variables on a 
designated dependent variable," which is precisely the goal for Question 1 (George & 
Mallery, 2009, p. 192). Multiple regression analysis is, therefore, appropriate to 
determine the influence of price elasticity of full-pay and aided students on unfunded 
institutional discount rate. 
Method Applied to Question 2 
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Question 2 seeks to determine the relationship between the unfunded institutional 
discount rate (dependent variable), price elasticity of full-pay and aided students 
(independent variables), and admissions selectivity, which adds independent variables to 
the equation: 
Du = ~1PEFP + ~2PEpp + ~3S + ~4(PEFP*S) + ~s(PEpp*S) + c (2) 
where Du represents the unfunded institutional discount rate in a given year, PEFP 
represents the price elasticity of full-pay students, PEpp represents the price elasticity of 
aided students, S represents the admit rate, (PE*S) represents the interaction of the 
respective price elasticity measure with admit rate, ~represents the respective regression 
coefficients, and c represents the intercept value. This model will be subjected to 
multiple regression analysis in ffiM SPSS (Version 19.0) and repeated for each of the 
nine years from 2001 to 2009. The period under analysis for Question 2 is limited to 
200 1 to 2009 because admissions data was not reported to IPEDS for previous years. 
Method Applied to Question 3 
Question 3 seeks to determine any changes in the ratio of funded institutional 
discount rate to unfunded institutional discount rate following the economic recession 
from 2007 to 2009. This question requires examining the effects of one independent 
variable (year) with 10 levels on one dependent variable (institutional aid ratio), for 
which analysis of variance is preferable to multiplet-tests (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007). 
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The ratio of funded to unfunded institutional discount rates, calculated for each of the 10 
years from 2000 to 2009, constitutes a repeated measure, which violates the assumption 
of independent observations in standard ANOV A (W einfurt, 2000). Repeated measures 
ANOV A is designed to accommodate measures taken over time, therefore, it will be 
applied to Question 3 using ffiM SPSS (Version 19.0). 
Method Applied to Question 4 
Question 4 seeks to determine any changes in the ratio of funded institutional 
discount rate to unfunded institutional discount rate following the economic recession 
from 2007 to 2009 based on endowment value per FTE. This question requires 
examining the effects of two independent variables (year-10 levels and endowment-4 
levels) on one dependent variable (institutional aid ratio). As in Question 3, analysis of 
variance is preferable to multiplet-tests (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007). The issue of 
repeated measures remains, therefore, repeated measures ANOV A will be applied to 
Question 4 using ffiM SPSS (Version 19.0). 
Since IPEDS only reports endowment data since 2003, endowment value per FTE 
cannot be calculated for alllO years ofthe period under analysis. To accommodate this 
limitation within the dataset, the average endowment per FTE for the five years from 
2005 to 2009 was calculated and used to separate the colleges into quartiles based on the 
calculated figure. This technique poses a risk of possibly masking interaction between 
endowment and the ratio of institutional aid. In order to be confident of appropriately 
reflecting endowment strength, the quartile stability from 2005 to 2009 was analyzed. 
Over these five years, only 29 of the 149 colleges (19.5%) included in the sample 
changed quartiles in any individual year during the period. 
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Table 6 
Stability of Endowment per FTE Quartiles (in %), 2005-2009 
Percent in Common between Years 
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2005 to 2009 
4th (Highest) 100.0 97.3 97.3 97.3 94.6 
3rd 89.2 94.6 91.2 89.2 78.4 
2nd 83.8 91.2 86.5 86.5 81.1 
1st (Lowest 89.5 97.3 92.1 94.6 89.2 
As shown in Table 6, the quartiles are generally stable between years. No college 
moved more than one quartile in any given year, indicating the movement is largely on 
the periphery of the quartiles. As would be expected, the schools from the 20th to 30th 
percentiles, 45th to 55th percentiles, and 70th to 80th percentiles accounted for much of 
this movement. Given this stability, the average of endowment per FTE from 2005 to 
2009 was deemed an appropriate reflection of endowment strength. 
Summary 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the implications of tuition discounting on 
institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at private 
baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. To this end, this study will analyze IPEDS 
data from 2000 to 2009 reported by colleges meeting the sampling criteria. Though 
!PEDS data is limited by its self-reported nature, there are sufficient quality checks 
within the system and within this dissertation study to be confident of the data's 
accuracy. 
In order to determine the relationship between the unfunded institutional discount 
rate and price elasticity of full-pay and aided students (Question I), multiple regression 
models for each of the 10 years under analysis will be calculated and compared. 
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In order to determine the relationship between the unfunded institutional discount 
rate and price elasticity of full-pay and aided students and admissions selectivity 
(Question 2), multiple regression models for each of the 10 years under analysis will be 
calculated and compared. 
In order to determine any changes in the ratio of funded institutional discount rate 
to unfunded institutional discount rate following the economic recession from 2007 to 
2009 (Question 3), a repeated measures analysis of variance will be conducted. 
Finally, in order to determine any changes in the ratio of funded institutional 
discount rate to unfunded institutional discount rate following the economic recession 
from 2007 to 2009 based on endowment value per FTE (Question 4), a repeated measures 
analysis of variance will be conducted. 
Chapter Four: Data Analysis and Results 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the implications of tuition discounting 
on institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at 
private baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. To this end, the study sought to 
address the overarching question: What are the implications of tuition discounting for 
institutional market strength at private baccalaureate colleges between 2000 and 2009? 
This chapter presents the results of the analyses performed to address the research 
questions. Modifications to the final sample occurred due to issues that emerged during 
data collection and these changes lead off the chapter. Next, presentation of trends within 
the sample creates a portrait of the data. Finally, reporting of the results of analyses by 
research question completes the chapter. 
Modification of the Sample 
Initially, a total of 149 colleges met the criteria for inclusion in the study as 
described in the previous chapter. Of these colleges, four were removed during the 
analysis stage, leaving 145 colleges in the final sample. Two colleges were removed for 
being subsidiaries of a parent institution. The other two colleges were removed for 
reporting comprehensive fees, which cannot be separated into the necessary tuition and 
fees used to calculate price elasticity. Tables AI and A2 in Appendix A list included and 
eliminated colleges respectively. 
Description of the Sample 
Even though all 145 colleges met this study's definition of a private baccalaureate 
college, many colleges in the sample were quite dissimilar from one another. Within a 
common focus on undergraduate education, each college operates with a highly 
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individualized set of circumstances. As shown in Table 7, the included colleges varied 
greatly in terms of published tuition and fees, enrollment, admissions selectivity, and 
endowment. 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for the Sample, 2008-2009 
Median Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Published Tuition and Fees($) 24,470 25,494 8,882 7,870 40,980 
Full-Time Undergraduates 1,218 1,332 636 91 3,028 
Admit Rate (%) 62.3 59.4 18.2 8.6 93.5 
Endowment/PTE ($) 49,302 105,412 182,241 764 1,175,646 
Unfunded Institutional Discount (%) 32.3 31.5 13.4 0.0 79.6 
Funded Institutional Discount(%) 4.7 7.2 7.6 0.0 44.9 
Three variables highlight the substantial differences among the sample. First, 
endowment per FTE ranges from $764 to more than $1.1 million, with nine colleges 
more than three standard deviations above the mean. Second, unfunded institutional 
discount ranges from 0.0% to 79.6% with two colleges more than three standard 
deviations above the mean. Third, funded institutional discount ranges from 0.0% to 
44.9% with three colleges more than three standard deviations above the mean. All three 
variables have a minimum possible value (zero) that can compress the distributions. 
Regardless, these variances highlight the wide ranges among colleges in the sample, 
particularly in terms of institutional wealth. 
The wealthier colleges differed significantly from their poorer counterparts. 
Endowment wealth correlated to higher funded institutional discounts, r(l42) = .453,p < 
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.001. Higher funded institutional discounts correlated to lower unfunded institutional 
discounts, r(144) = -.307,p < .001. In other words, wealthier colleges provided greater 
funded discounts, reducing discounting through unfunded institutional aid. 
Two noteworthy trends emerged among the sample. First, unfunded institutional 
discounts increased while funded institutional discounts simultaneously decreased. This 
inverse relationship is shown in Figure 11. From 2000 to 2009, the median unfunded 
institutional discount rate increased from 27.3% to 32.3% while the median funded 
institutional discount rate declined from 5.6% to 4.7%. 
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Figure 11. Median funded and unfunded institutional discount rates for the sample, 
2000-2009. 
Scholarship allowance, the measure of tuition discounting reported by the College 
Board and NACUBO, includes both funded and unfunded institutional aid. The median 
scholarship allowance among colleges in the sample grew from 35.3% to 40.5% from 
2000 to 2009. The increasing unfunded institutional discounts at these colleges provided 
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for the growth in scholarship allowance despite declining funded institutional discounts. 
Rising tuition combined with less full-pay students required colleges to increase their 
scholarship allowance levels. 
As shown in Figure 12, the median published tuition and fees increased from 
2000 to 2009. In theory, colleges in the sample could have offset the increasing 
unfunded institutional aid levels through higher tuition, though, as previously described, 
higher tuition and higher discounts go hand-in-hand. The percentage of full-pay students 
declined during the same period, however, indicating that discounts were both larger and 
given to a larger percentage of enrolling students. 
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Figure 12. Median tuition and fees and percentage of enrolling full-pay students for the 
sample, 2000-2009. 
The median percentage of full-pay students in entering freshmen classes has 
declined markedly since 2003, an alarming trend for colleges in the sample. Though each 
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college operates with its own level of demand, this overall trend indicates a declining 
willingness and/or ability of enrolling freshmen to pay full tuition. Given the diminishing 
levels of enrolling full-pay students, colleges in the sample may have already passed a 
tipping point in tuition price. It is particularly alarming the decline in percentage of full-
pay students began before the economic recession from 2007 to 2009. 
The second noteworthy trend is the enrollment growth at many colleges in the 
sample. Only 17 of the 145 colleges maintained a relatively unchanged enrollment 
(varied by less than 2.5%) from 2000 to 2009. As shown in Figure 13, roughly a fifth of 
the sample grew by more than 30.0%, including five colleges that more than doubled in 
size. Overall, colleges in the sample grew by a median of9.9% during the decade. Not 
all colleges grew, however, as roughly one-fifth of the sample saw enrollment decline. 
The middle three-fifths of the sample grew by an average of 11.4%. 
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Figure 13. Distribution of the sample by percent change in full-time undergraduate 
enrollment, 2000-2009. 
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Description of Calculated Variables 
All variables included in the statistical analyses required calculation from data 
reported directly to IPEDS. The following sections describe the processes used to 
calculate variables. Problems that arose are described by variable, including the methods 
used to address problema~ic data. 
Unfunded Institutional Discount 
Unfunded institutional discount was calculated as unfunded institutional grants 
divided by gross tuition and fees. Unfunded institutional grants are directly reported. 
Gross tuition and fees was calculated as the sum of two directly reported values, total 
tuition and fees plus allowances applied to tuition and fees. IPEDS reports tuition and fee 
revenue as the net amounts collected, so adding the allowances yields the gross amounts. 
Table 8 summarizes the resulting values for unfunded institutional discounts from 2000 
to 2009. 
Table 8 
Unfunded Institutional Discount Rates (%)for the Sample, 2000-2009 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean 27.2 26.8 27.2 27.9 28.3 28.8 29.7 30.1 30.0 31.5 
Median 27.3 27.1 27.8 27.7 28.1 28.0 28.7 29.2 29.8 32.3 
Std. Dev. 13.5 13.9 13.8 13.7 13.1 13.5 13.4 13.3 13.4 13.4 
Minimum 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 80.7 77.3 78.7 79.4 79.4 81.8 86.0 82.9 82.9 79.6 
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Funded Institutional Discount 
Funded institutional discount was calculated as funded institutional grants divided 
by gross tuition and fees. Funded institutional grants are directly reported. Gross tuition 
and fees was calculated as the sum of two reported values, total tuition and fees plus 
allowances applied to tuition and fees. Table 9 summarizes the resulting values for 
funded institutional aid from 2000 to 2009. 
Table 9 
Funded Institutional Discount Rates (%)for the Sample, 2000-2009 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean 8.3 8.5 8.1 7.9 7.7 7.3 7.0 7.1 7.4 7.2 
Median 5.6 5.9 5.4 5.6 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.5 5.1 4.7 
Std. Dev. 7.9 8.1 8.1 7.7 7.9 7.6 7.0 7.2 7.4 7.6 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Maximum 43.6 46.7 48.6 50.5 49.4 47.5 46.2 46.1 44.8 44.9 
Price Elasticity 
Price elasticity was calculated from several intermediate variables computed from 
data directly reported to IPEDS. As described in the previous chapter, price elasticity 
was calculated for full-pay students (PEFP) using the following formula: 
((Xppyear2 f Eyear2) - (XFPyearl I Eyeart)) 
PEFP = ___ __,;.(X-=FPy...t.:ear=.!..-1 _I Ey..;,;.z,:::ear~l~) ___ _ 
(Pyear2 - Pyearl) 
Pyearl 
In the formula, XFP equals the number of full-pay students, E equals the enrolling 
financial aid cohort, and P equals the published tuition and fees. E is a directly reported 
IPEDS value. XFP was calculated by subtracting from E the number of students receiving 
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institutional aid (Xpp ), a directly reported value. P was calculated by adding tuition and 
required fees, both of which are directly reported IPEDS values. 
Price elasticity for aided, or partial-pay, students (PEpp) was calculated using the 
same formula by substituting the number of aided students (Xpp) for XFP and the average 
price for aided students (Paid) for P. Xpp was directly reported to IPEDS. Paid was 
calculated by subtracting from P the average amount of institutional grant received, a 
directly reported value. Paid was not allowed to be a negative value, which indicated the 
average amount of aid received was greater than published tuition and fees. This 
scenario is possible if the average aid package provided for expenses beyond tuition and 
fees (e.g., room and board). Three negative values were changed to $0 (3 occurrences, 
representing 0.2% of the data). These negative values, which ranged from -$656 to 
-$2,530, may have been due to reporting error. Each instance occurred at a different 
college, none of which showed a pattern of Paid values approaching zero. 
The average amount of institutional grant aid was only reported for 2001 to 2009, 
which limited the ability to calculate Paid· As a result, PEpp could only be calculated for 
the eight years from 2002 to 2009. Since PEpp was limited to these years, PEFP was only 
calculated for these years as well. Analyses for Question 1 and Question 2 were, 
therefore, confined to data from 2002 to 2009. 
A zero value for XFP in a given year proved problematic by resulting in a zero as 
the denominator in the price elasticity calculation. If computed as yielding a value of 
zero, the resulting price elasticity would inaccurately indicate inelastic demand. In these 
instances, a missing value placeholder of"." was substituted (123 occurrences, 
representing 8.5% of the data). A total of 38 colleges had no full-pay students in a given 
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year during the period. Of these colleges, 25 colleges had no full-pay students in two or 
more years, including 11 colleges with no full-pay students in five or more years. 
No change in tuition price (P or Paid) between years was equally problematic, also 
resulting in zero as the denominator of a fraction in the formula (27 occurrences, 2.1% of 
the data). A total of 146 PEFP values, representing 12.6% of the data, were treated as 
missing. A total of 34 PEpp values, representing 2.9% of the data, were treated as 
missing for any of the described reasons. 
If any component of the price elasticity calculation for either full..;pay or partial-
pay students was missing in a given year, the college was eliminated from the regression 
for that specific year. Missing data could result from an omission in IPEDS reporting by 
the college or violating one of the protocols previously described in this section. Since 
elimination was done on a year-by-year basis, a college could be excluded from the 
regression for one year and included for other years. Of the 145 colleges in the sample, a 
total of 37 colleges were excluded from at least one year's regression due to missing data. 
Seven colleges were removed from more than half of the regressions. Table 10 displays 
the number of colleges eliminated from the regression in a given year due to missing 
data. 
Table 10 
Colleges Eliminated from Analyses for Missing Values, 2000-2009 
2002 2003 
n 21 15 
% 14.5 10.3 
2004 
15 
10.3 
2005 
15 
10.3 
2006 2007 2008 
19 27 22 
13.1 18.6 15.2 
2009 Mean 
26 20 
17.9 13.8 
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This level of missing data provides cause for concern. The missing data would be 
more problematic if the undertaken study was not essentially of the entire population. As 
described in the previous chapter, a total of 179 colleges met this study's criteria to be 
considered a private baccalaureate college. The final sample of 145 colleges represents 
81.0% of the population. Even after eliminating cases from the sample, no less than 
65.9% of the total population was included in a given year. 
Once calculated, the price elasticity values varied dramatically among the 
colleges in the sample. As shown in Table 11, at least one of the calculated PEFP values 
in any given year varied by more than three standard deviations from the mean. Two 
values, one in 2005 (11.3 SD above the mean) and another in 2006 (11.2 SD above the 
mean) were more than 10 standard deviations from the mean. The percentage of colleges 
with PEFP values greater than zero is also reported in Table 11. As described in chapter 
2, an elasticity value above zero indicated the presence of a Chi vas Regal effect at these 
colleges. Normal economic behavior calls for the PEFP value to be negative, reflecting a 
decrease in quantity demanded corresponding to any increase in price. In contrast, these 
colleges showed an increasing quantity demanded despite an increase in price. 
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Table 11 
Calculated PEFP Values for the Sample, 2002-2009 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean 6.97 -0.35 -0.77 52.83 865.81 5.23 4.37 5.01 
Median 0.02 -1.88 -0.81 -0.93 -0.11 0.00 -0.65 -1.05 
Std. Dev. 35.78 16.48 64.33 530.00 9,753.19 27.86 38.21 39.09 
Minimum -25.96 -42.67 -595.02 -35.59 -73.94 -21.14 -25.84 -103.86 
Maximum 309.52 96.51 393.67 6,081.18 109,913.07 183.20 331.55 283.78 
PE>O (%) 50.8 38.6 42.0 40.9 46.5 49.6 40.5 37.0 
Outliers (n) 2 4 2 1 1 4 2 2 
Note. Outliers defined as+/- 3 SD from the mean. 
As shown in Table 12, the calculated PEpp values were somewhat more normally 
distributed. At least one outlier occurred in any given year, however. Four values, one in 
2002 (I 0.9 SD below the mean), one in 2004 (11.6 SD below the mean), one in 2007 
(11.7 SD below the mean), and one in 2009 (11.1 SD below the mean) were more than 10 
standard deviations from the mean. The percentage of PEpp values greater than zero 
indicated the presence of a Chivas Regal effect among aided students at some colleges. 
Any conclusions must be carefully drawn in comparing the PEFP and PEpp values. 
The mean values suggest greater price sensitivity among aided students compared to full-
pay students, however, the median values are much more similar. In fact, the median 
values reflect slightly greater sensitivity among full-pay students. Given the presence of 
substantial outliers, the median offers a better measure of central tendency. Median PEFP 
values ranged from -1.88 to .02 and were positive in only two ofthe eight years. Median 
PEpp values ranged from -.04 to .08 and were greater than zero in three of the eight years. 
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Further caution must be exercised given the percentage of colleges demonstrating a 
Chivas Regal effect in a given year. No less than 37.0% ofPEFP values and no less than 
40.4% ofPEpp values were greater than zero in a given year. These percentages indicate 
substantial differences in pricing power within the sample. 
Table 12 
Calculated PEpp Values for the Sample, 2002-2009 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean -1.03 -0.26 -1.50 -0.21 0.07 -8.61 -0.12 -2.99 
Median 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.00 
Std. Dev. 14.27 3.97 17.41 8.06 6.09 106.95 6.65 36.91 
Minimum -156.29 -24.96 -204.08 -78.64 -48.06 -1,259.65 -62.36 -414.31 
Maximum 43.67 12.55 11.04 23.73 39.37 113.50 37.10 84.03 
PE>O(%) 51.5 45.7 49.0 55.3 47.2 40.4 50.4 47.2 
Outliers (n) 2 4 1 2 3 1 2 1 
Note. Outliers defined as +/- 3 SD from the mean. 
In examining the components of the price elasticity formula, several reasons were 
found for the extreme values. Given the relatively small enrolling cohorts, these values 
could differ substantially in a given year. The average enrolling cohort in a given year 
was 337 students with a standard deviation of36 students, or 10.7% of the average 
enrolling cohort. Changes of this magnitude in opposite directions could create very 
large values, both positive and negative, in the numerator of the price elasticity formula. 
In addition, some tuition and fee changes could create very small values in the 
denominator of the formula. Given the relatively small size of the numbers at work, the 
price elasticity formula proved highly sensitive. 
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Beyond typical measures of variability, another problem existed with the data. 
Some of the resulting negative values are theoretically impossible. The formula for price 
elasticity used in this study divides percent change in enrollment over percent change in 
price. As such, the lowest possible value is -100, which indicates that a 1% increase in 
price corresponded to a 100% decrease in enrollment. An enrollment decrease of 100% 
results in zero students attending the college for that given year, therefore, any lower 
price elasticity is impossible. Such theoretically impossible values occurred seven times 
(0.3% of the data). These values were attributed to the sensitivity in the formula, in 
which an enrollment decline of or approaching 100% combined with a tuition increase of 
less than 1% could yield a theoretically impossible outcome. 
Selectivity 
Selectivity was defined as the admission rate, which was calculated as total 
admissions divided by total applications. The applications and admissions data were 
directly reported from 2001 to 2009, so the admission rate could only be calculated for 
those nine years. Table 13 summarizes the resulting values in each year. Selectivity 
increased from 2001 to 2009. Though the change appears incremental, statistically 
significant differences did occur in the period. An ANOV A using a Greenhouse-Geisser 
adjustment for repeated measures yielded F(5, 609) = 13.551,p < .001. In general, the 
increase in selectivity proved statistically significant every two years. 
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Table 13 
Calculated Admission Rates(%), 2001-2009 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Mean 67.9 65.7 65.0 63.6 64.0 61.0 60.8 57.6 59.4 
Median 74.2 71.7 71.1 69.7 66.8 63.8 62.7 62.3 62.3 
Std. Dev. 19.4 19.5 19.6 19.9 18.9 19.5 19.9 19.4 18.2 
Minimum 11.8 12.4 3.5 13.6 11.8 12.0 10.4 11.7 8.6 
Maximum 97.8 99.4 97.6 98.3 98.5 99.0 98.0 97.7 93.5 
Endowment per FTE 
Endowment per FTE was calculated by dividing the reported endowment value at 
the beginning of the fiscal year by the fall FTE enrollment, both of which are directly 
reported to !PEDS. The computed values for the year 2004 were problematic. In this 
year, more than 87% of the reported values varied by more than 25% from both the 
preceding and subsequent years. In examining the reported values both in comparison to 
the adjacent years and against values also reported to the Chronicle of Higher Education 
for 2004, it appeared the overwhelming majority of data for this year were reported in 
error. Given the widespread erroneous data, the entire year needed to be eliminated from 
the dataset. 
Given the elimination of endowment data from 2003-04, the methodology was 
adapted to use endowment quartile for only 2009 in Question 4. This question asked 
how, if at all, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 affected the balance of funded 
and unfunded institutional aid based on endowment value. As reported in the previous 
chapter, the endowment quartiles were highly stable over time as more than 80% of the 
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colleges remained in the same quartile from 2002 to 2009. As a final cleaning measure, 
the endowment values in 2009 were compared for variance of greater than 25% from the 
previous year. This identified three cases, two of which varied by less than 28% and 
remained unchanged in the dataset. The third case varied by 99%, so it was deemed to be 
a reporting error and treated as missing data. As shown in Table 14, the bottom three 
endowment quartiles groupings were relatively tight. The highest quartile, which 
included the wealthy outliers, varied widely. 
Table 14 
Endowment Quartiles for the Sample, 2008-2009 
M Mdn Std. Dev. Min Max 
4 (highest) 309,561 197,063 274,110 108,809 1,175,646 
3 69,538 60,393 18,936 49,970 105,786 
2 31,938 30,676 9,003 19,859 49,302 
1 (lowest) 9,615 9,008 5,730 764 19,664 
Results by Research Question 
Questions 1 and 2 addressed the relationship of price elasticity for both full-pay 
and aided students to unfunded institutional discount. Questions 3 and 4 investigated 
changes in the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount over time. The results 
are presented by question. 
Question 1 
Question 1 queried about the relationship of tuition price elasticity of demand for 
full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate. Using the full 
dataset, a multiple regression was run for each year from 2002 to 2009 for the model: 
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(1) 
In the model equation, Du represents the unfunded institutional discount rate. As shown 
in Table 15, the model was statistically significant for two years, 2005 and 2007. The 
regression coefficients are reported for these years in Table 16. The model for 2005 
yielded one significant predictor variable, price elasticity of full-pay students. The model 
for 2007 yielded no significant predictor variables. 
Table 15 
Regression Results for Modell (all data included), 2002-2009 
Adjusted SE of the Durbin-
Sig. R Rz Rz Estimate Watson 
2002 .603 .092 .008 -.008 .1166602 1.905 
2003 .942 .031 .001 -.015 .1299902 1.941 
2004 .118 .183 .033 .018 .1220866 1.684 
2005* .025 .240 .057 .042 .1139619 2.105 
2006 .078 .202 .041 .025 .1166765 2.003 
2007* .044 .231 .053 .037 .1160647 2.176 
2008 .115 .188 .035 .019 .1167010 2.248 
2009 .111 .194 .038 .021 .1204842 2.249 
Note. *indicates p < .05, **indicates p < .01, ***indicates p < .001. 
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Table 16 
Regression Coefficients for Significant Model Years in Model 1 (all data included) 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
~ SE ~ t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(constant) .283 .010 27.942 .000 
V'l 
4.2 X 10"5 0 PEFP* .000 .194 2.237 .027 1.000 1.000 0 
N 
PEpp -.002 .001 -.142 -1.632 .105 1.000 1.000 
(constant) .293 .011 26.820 .000 
t-
0 PEFP .001 .000 .145 1.592 .114 .999 1.001 0 
N 
PEpp .000 .000 .175 1.921 .057 .999 1.001 
Note.* indicatesp< .05, ** indicatesp< .01, *** indicatesp< .001. 
Because of the mixed significant results when using the entire dataset, the 
regressions for Model 1 were run again excluding PEFP and PEpp outliers, defmed as 
values more than three standard deviations from the mean. Tables 11 and 12 display the 
number of outliers in each given year for PEFP and PEpp respectively. In 2005, a total of 
three outlying values were eliminated, including a PEFP value 11.3 SD above the mean. 
In 2007, a total of five outlying values were eliminated, including a PEpp value 11.7 SD 
below the mean. 
As shown in Table 17, the model was not statistically significant in any year with 
the outliers eliminated. This indicates the statistically significant results using the entire 
dataset were likely caused by the extreme outliers in a given year. The null hypothesis 
was, therefore, confirmed. No statistically significant relationship existed between elastic 
demand by either full-pay or aided students and unfunded institutional discount. 
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Table 17 
Regression Results for Model 1 (outliers excluded), 2002-2009. 
Adjusted SE of the Durbin-
Sig. R R2 R2 Estimate Watson 
2002 .850 .053 .003 -.015 .1178678 2.005 
2003 .166 .172 .030 .013 .1294579 1.783 
2004 .727 .072 .005 -.011 .1227299 1.706 
2005 .173 .168 .028 .012 .1123098 2.010 
2006 .351 .133 .018 .001 .1169386 1.860 
2007 .946 .032 .001 -.017 .1166006 2.217 
2008 .115 .188 .035 .019 .1167010 2.271 
2009 .150 .182 .033 .016 .1190813 2.217 
Note.* indicatesp < .05, ** indicatesp < .01, *** indicatesp < .001. 
Question 2 
Question 2 queried the relationship of the price elasticity of demand for full-pay 
and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate based on admissions 
selectivity. Using the full dataset, a multiple regression was run for each year from 2002 
to 2009 for the model: 
In the model equation, the new components were represented by S for selectivity and 
(PE*S) for the interaction of selectivity with the respective price elasticity measure. 
Table 18 reports the results of this statistical model for each year. The model was 
statistically significant for all years from 2002 to 2009. · 
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Table 18 
Regression Results for Model 2, 2002-2009. 
Adjusted SE of the Durbin-
Sig. R R2 R2 Estimate Watson 
2002*** .001 .400 .160 .122 .1067200 1.781 
2003*** .000 .440 .193 .159 .1156178 1.810 
2004*** .000 .427 .183 .148 .1104204 1.536 
2005*** .000 .520 .270 .239 .0988444 1.735 
2006*** .000 .479 .229 .202 .1029759 1.940 
2007*** .000 .466 .217 .180 .1048872 2.182 
2008*** .000 .522 .273 .240 .0989291 2.185 
2009*** .000 .450 .202 .165 .1097316 2.140 
Note. *indicates p < .05, **indicates p < .01, ***indicates p < .001. 
The regression coefficients are reported for these years in Table 19. In2006, mM 
SPSS (Version 19 .0) excluded the variable for the interaction of selectivity with price 
elasticity for full-pay students (S*PEFP) due to collinearity (tolerance= 5.22 x 10-7, VIF = 
1,915,113.76). This was the only model year in which a variable was excluded by the 
software. Selectivity was a significant predictor variable in all years from 2002 to 2009. 
In 2005, both PEFP and S*PEFP were identified as significant predictor variables, but the 
collinearity statistics were problematic for both. 
In order to address the collinearity issue, the regressions were run again using a 
stepwise technique. As shown in Table 20, the models were statistically significant for 
all years from 2002 to 2009. As shown in Table 21, with collinearity issues eliminated, 
selectivity remains a significant predictor variable in all years. Price elasticity for full-
pay students in 2005 and the interaction of selectivity and price elasticity for aided 
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students in 2009 were found to be significant predictor variables. In both instances, the 
beta values were extremely small. 
Given the significant results for the model in each year, the null hypothesis was 
rejected. Selectivity was found to be the only significant predictor variable in Model 2. 
The other two variables found to be significant predictors in a single year were dismissed 
due to the small beta values and exclusion in eight of the nine years. The beta value 
reflects the amount of variance accounted for by the variable, so the small values 
indicated large amounts of unexplained variance. 
Table 19 
Regression Coefficients for Significant Years in Mode/2 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Variable ~ SE ~ t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)** .102 .039 2.661 .009 
PEpp .002 .002 .495 .934 .353 .027 37.210 
N PEpp .003 .005 .437 .696 .488 .019 52.126 
0 
0 
N Selectivity*** .250 .056 .407 4.459 .000 .908 1.102 
S*PEFP -.002 .003 -.468 -.883 .379 .027 37.077 
S*PEpp -.006 .007 -.509 -.812 .419 .019 51.991 
(Constant)** .111 .037 3.040 .003 
PEpp -.008 .005 -1.055 -1.606 .111 .016 62.636 
M PEpp .007 .009 .211 .741 .460 .085 11.805 0 
0 
N Selectivity*** .261 .054 .403 4.815 .000 .982 1.018 
S*PEFP .011 .007 1.098 1.672 .097 .016 62.610 
S*PEpp -.011 .014 -.222 -.778 .438 .085 11.777 
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Table 19 Cont'd 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Variable p SE p t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)*** .137 .033 4.192 .000 
PEFP -.001 .001 -.798 1.01~ .315 .011 89.429 
'o::t PEpp .008 .009 .242 .907 .366 .098 10.229 0 0 
N 
Selectivity*** .238 .050 .405 4.793 .000 .978 1.022 
S*PEFP .001 .002 .673 .850 .397 .011 89.655 
S*PEpp -.014 .016 -.240 -.891 .375 .096 10.368 
(Constant)*** .130 .034 3.818 .000 
PEFP* .001 .001 6.822 2.600 .011 .001 1093.735 
II') 
PEpp -.005 .008 -.353 -.667 .506 .023 44.323 
0 Selectivity*** .258 .051 .422 5.047 .000 .899 1.112 0 N 
S*PEFP* -.002 .001 -6.617 2.522 .013 .001 1093.588 
S*PEpp .003 .010 .152 .287 .774 .023 44.174 
(Constant)*** .142 .032 4.383 .000 
PEFP .000 .000 -.009 -.111 .912 .999 1.001 
\0 
0 PEpp -.009 .005 -.542 1.84~ .067 .079 12.729 0 N 
Selectivity*** .252 .051 .417 4.969 .000 .962 1.040 
S*PEpp .011 .008 .429 1.468 .145 .079 12.641 
(Constant)*** .154 .033 4.704 .000 
PEFP .003 .003 .748 1.259 .211 .021 48.218 
PEpp .002 .001 2.100 1.453 .149 .004 285.370 
r- Selectivity*** .236 .052 .399 4.583 .000 .967 1.034 0 0 
N 
S*PEFP -.004 .004 -.606 1.02~ .310 .021 48.238 
S*PEpp -.005 .004 -1.970 1.36~ .176 .003 285.989 
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Table 19 Cont'd 
Unstandardized Standardized Collinearity Statistics 
Variable p SE p t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
(Constant)*** .147 .028 5.176 .000 
PEFP -.003 .002 -.989 1.273 .206 .011 92.867 
00 PEpp .001 .005 .067 .207 .837 .061 16.408 0 0 
N 
Selectivity*** .270 .047 .468 5.725 .000 .971 1.030 
S*PEpp .004 .003 .968 1.267 .208 .011 89.890 
S*PEpp .004 .011 .120 .350 .727 .055 18.058 
(Constant)*** .155 .036 4.263 .000 
PEpp -.002 .002 -.540 -.735 .464 .014 72.583 
0\ PEpp -.001 .002 
0 
-.260 -.343 .732 .013 76.873 
0 
Selectivity*** N .258 .059 .383 4.400 .000 .985 1.015 
S*PEpp .003 .004 .561 .763 .447 .014 72.653 
S*PEpp .002 .003 .525 .693 .490 .013 77.035 
Table 20 
Regression Results for Model 2 Using Stepwise Technique, 2002-2009 
Adjusted SE of the Durbin-
Sig. R R2 R2 Estimate Watson 
2002*** .000 .380 .144 .137 .1058225 1.399 
2003*** .000 .405 .164 .157 .1157065 1.419 
2004*** .000 .396 .157 .150 .1102653 1.524 
2005*** .000 .454 .206 .193 .1017613 1.687 
2006*** .000 .446 .199 .192 .1036499 1.583 
2007*** .000 .392 .154 .146 .1070449 1.642 
2008*** .000 .492 .242 .235 .0992463 1.729 
2009*** .000 .443 .197 .182 .1086090 1.740 
Note.* indicates p < .05, **indicates p < .01, ***indicates p < .001. 
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Table 21 
Regression Coefficients for Model 2 Using Stepwise Technique 
Collinearity 
Unstandardized Standardized Statistics 
Variable p SE p t Sig. Tolerance VIF 
N (Constant)** .117 .036 3.236 .002 
0 
0 
Selectivity*** N .233 .053 .380 4.402 .000 1.000 1.000 
("f) (Constant)** .111 .036 3.043 .003 
0 
0 
N Selectivity*** .262 .054 .405 4.879 .000 1.000 1.000 
'<t" (Constant)*** .140 .032 4.323 .000 
0 
0 
Selectivity*** .233 N .049 .396 4.749 .000 1.000 1.000 
(Constant)*** .130 .033 3.903 .000 
II) Selectivity*** .251 .050 .410 5.015 .000 .999 1.001 0 
0 
N 4.23 X PEFP** 10-5 .000 .206 2.522 .013 .999 1.001 
\0 (Constant)*** .128 .032 4.025 .000 
0 
0 
N Selectivity*** .269 .050 .446 5.387 .000 1.000 1.000 
t"-- (Constant)*** .158 .033 4.848 .000 
0 
0 
Selectivity*** N .233 .052 .392 4.496 .000 1.000 1.000 
00 (Constant)*** .140 
0 
.028 4.936 .000 
0 
Selectivity*** N .284 .047 .492 6.082 .000 1.000 1.000 
(Constant)** .157 .036 4.368 .000 
0\ 
0 Selectivity*** .257 .058 .381 4.430 .000 .987 1.013 0 
N 
S*PEpp** .001 .000 .274 3.189 .002 .987 1.013 
Note.* indicatesp< .05, ** indicatesp< .01, *** indicatesp< .001. 
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Question 3 
Question 3 asked how, if at all, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 
affected the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates. Using a 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment for repeated measures, an analysis of variance found no 
significant differences was among the years 2000 to 2009, F(l,l30) = .955,p > .05. The 
null hypothesis is, therefore, confirmed that no significant change occurred in the ratio of 
funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the economic recession from 
2007 to 2009. 
Question 4 
Question 4 asked how, if at all, the economic recession from 2007 to 2009 
affected the balance of funded and unfunded institutional aid based on endowment value. 
Using a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment for repeated measures, an analysis of variance 
found no significant differences among the years 2000 to 2009, F(1,125) = .939,p > .05. 
The null hypothesis is, therefore, confirmed that no significant difference based on 
endowment value existed in the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates 
following the economic recession from 2007 to 2009. 
Summary 
A total of 145 colleges were analyzed in the final sample. Though the sample 
varied greatly in terms of published tuition and fees, enrollment, admissions selectivity, 
and endowment value, two common trends emerged. First, unfunded institutional 
discount increased while funded institutional discount simultaneously decreased from 
2000 to 2009. Second, enrollment grew by a median of9.9% from 2000 to 2009 with 
many of the colleges in the sample experiencing even greater growth. 
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In calculating price elasticity values, the formula was found to be highly sensitive 
and yielded a number of extreme values. To account for the large variances within the 
dataset, if initial statistical analysis on the entire sample was inconclusive, the analysis 
was run again with the outliers beyond three standard deviations eliminated. Given the 
number of significant outliers, no defmitive price elasticity conclusions could be drawn 
for the entire sample. 
In regard to Question 1, no statistically significant relationship was found between 
unfunded institutional discount and the predictor variables of price elasticity for full-pay 
students and price elasticity for aided students. The null hypothesis was, therefore, 
confirmed. 
In regard to Question 2, a statistically significant relationship was found between 
unfunded institutional discount and the predictor variable of selectivity. The null 
hypothesis was, therefore, rejected. 
In regard to Question 3, no statistically significant differences were found in the 
ratio of funded to unfunded institutional discount from 2000 to 2009. The null 
hypothesis was, therefore, confirmed. 
In regard to Question 4, no statistically significant differences were found in the 
ratio of funded to unfunded institutional discount by endowment quartile from 2000 to 
2009. The null hypothesis was, therefore, confirmed. 
From these results, price elasticity must be considered highly individual to the 
institution, making general conclusions for all private baccalaureate colleges difficult. 
Selectivity, an indicator of demand for enrollment, was significantly related to unfunded 
institutional aid, indicating that colleges with lower selectivity award more unfunded aid. 
No significant changes occurred in the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional 
discounts, indicating the distribution of institutional discounts between funded and 
unfunded aid among colleges in the sample was unaffected by the recession of 2007 to 
2009. 
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Chapter Five: Conclusions and Recommendations 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the implications of tuition discounting 
on institutional market strength by examining the use of unfunded institutional aid at 
private baccalaureate colleges from 2000 to 2009. Market strength, the ability to enroll a 
sufficient number of students yielding sufficient tuition revenue, is a critical component 
of an institution's overall financial strength, particularly at private baccalaureate colleges, 
which are overwhelmingly dependent upon tuition for survival. 
This chapter discusses the conclusions and implications for colleges and 
institutional leaders based on this study's results. First, the findings are summarized and 
interpreted in light of the existing literature in the area. Then, the study and its 
methodology are critiqued. Finally, implications for practice and recommendations for 
further research are offered. 
Summary of Findings 
The first research question investigated the relationship of price elasticity for full-
pay and aided students relative to the unfunded institutional discount rate. Analysis of 
the full dataset yielded inconclusive results as the model was significant in two of the 
eight years analyzed, though with low R2 values. Thus, outliers in the dataset that were 
more than three standard deviations from the mean were removed and the regressions 
recalculated. With outliers eliminated, the model was non-significant in all the years 
included in this study. The null hypothesis was, therefore, confirmed. No statistically 
significant relationship existed between elastic demand by either full-pay or aided 
students and unfunded institutional discount rate during the period of analysis. This 
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outcome indicates price elasticity for either full-pay or aided students was not directly 
linked to unfunded institutional discounting. 
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Next, the second research question examined the relationship of the price 
elasticity for full-pay and aided students to the unfunded institutional discount rate based 
on admissions selectivity. The model was statistically significant for all years from 2002 
to 2009 with selectivity as a significant predictor variable in all years. The null 
hypothesis was, therefore, rejected. Selectivity was a statistically significant predictor of 
unfunded institutional discount. As selectivity decreased, the rate of unfunded 
institutional discounting increased. 
The third research question investigated how, if at all, the economic recession 
from 2007 to 2009 affected the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates. 
An ANOV A using a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment for repeated measures proved non-
significant. The null hypothesis was, therefore, confirmed. No significant change 
occurred in the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the 
economic recession from 2007 to 2009. 
The fmal research question examined how, if at all, the economic recession from 
2007 to 2009 affected the balance of funded and unfunded institutional aid based on 
endowment value. Again, an ANOV A using a Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment for 
repeated measures was conducted with non-significant results. The null hypothesis was, 
therefore, confirmed. No significant difference based on endowment value occurred in 
the ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discount rates following the economic 
recession from 2007 to 2009. 
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Interpretation of Findings 
Any interpretation of these findings must consider the substantial variance among 
the measured variables within the sample. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
private baccalaureate colleges in the sample varied greatly in terms of tuition, enrollment, 
admissions selectivity, and endowment wealth. The ranges for endowment value, 
unfunded institutional discount, and funded institutional discount rate were particularly 
large. On the one hand, these differences provided a means to look at the impact of 
tuition discounting based upon the variation among the sample colleges. On the other 
hand, the small sample size meant that this variability had larger influence on the 
statistical fmdings and outcomes. The calculated price elasticity values for both full-pay 
and aided students proved highly volatile, both across the sample and even for the same 
college in different years. 
This study's sampling methodology yielded colleges with a similar emphasis on 
undergraduate education, but vast differences in terms of the institutional fmancial 
strength supporting that educational model. Financial strength includes factors such as 
endowment wealth, net tuition revenue per student, and demand for enrollment. Previous 
studies, such as Ruterbusch (2004), used a similar methodology to this study of sampling 
by institutional type as have the preeminent reports on tuition discounting by NACUBO 
and The College Board. In this study, a significant relationship between price elasticity 
and unfunded institutional aid failed to emerge for the entire sample, evidenced by the 
non-significant results in several of the analyses. In hindsight, incorporating 
methodology to further group the sample according to financial strength may have 
reduced the volatility of the price elasticity variables. 
112 
Breneman (1994) described the financial strength of the 212 colleges in his 
sample through a composite ranking of endowment per FTE, net tuition revenue per FTE, 
and admit rate, but refrained from drawing conclusions for the entire sample or 
conducting analyses on the resulting groups. Breneman (1994) instead elected to 
comment directly on only 12 visited colleges, which were selected in part to represent a 
spectrum of financial strength. The visited colleges intentionally varied in a number of 
other areas, such as published tuition price, religious affiliation, and geographic region. 
This methodology acknowledged that outcomes can differ greatly among institutions with 
a similar educational emphasis, but very different circumstances, as is the case for the 
private baccalaureate colleges included in this study. 
For instance, private baccalaureate colleges with lower endowment wealth 
demonstrated less ability to provide enrolling students with funded institutional aid. As 
described in the previous chapter, greater endowment wealth correlated to higher funded 
institutional discounts within the sample, r(142) = .453, p < .00 1. Higher funded 
institutional discounts correlated to lower unfunded institutional discounts, r( 144) = 
-.307,p < .001. In other words, wealthier colleges can provide greater funded discounts, 
reducing discounting through unfunded institutional aid. Poorer colleges must rely more 
heavily on unfunded institutional aid. All of the sampled institutions qualified as private 
baccalaureate colleges, yet differed in the financial model used to support that 
educational focus and, therefore, the institutional motivation for discounting tuition. This 
study's sampling methodology, which followed the precedent of other existing studies, 
did not address these differences. 
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With appropriate consideration of the sample's disparate nature, there are several 
noteworthy findings. First, selectivity was significantly related to unfunded institutional 
discounting. Less selective colleges must increasingly provide unfunded institutional 
discounts. The results of this study confirm this relationship, which aligns with a 
prevailing theme of other existing studies (Basch, 1996, 1997; Baum et al., 201 0; Bowen 
& Breneman, 1993; Breneman, 1994; Buss et al., 2004; Ehrenberg & Sherman, 1984; 
Redd, 2000). Selectivity serves as a proxy for market size, representing the percentage of 
applicants that can be rejected while maintaining desired enrollment levels (Breneman, 
1994). Market size is a key component of market strength, reflecting the volume of 
potential students in a college's market. Since less selectivity indicates a smaller market 
size, this study's findings indicate that higher levels of unfunded institutional discounting 
revealed weaker market strength. 
The link between lower selectivity and higher unfunded discounts suggests that if 
these colleges are not able to increase the size of their respective markets, unfunded 
discounting must increase to provide an incentive for the desired number of students to 
enroll. Continually increasing unfunded discounts results in a perilous cycle for a 
college's overall financial health as discounts eventually reach a level that reduces the net 
tuition revenue per student (Jenny, 1997; McPherson & Shapiro, 1998). Such a cycle 
ultimately jeopardizes a college's continuing operation, as was the case for Dana College 
in Nebraska, a private baccalaureate college that closed in 2010. In its last decade of 
existence, Dana College provided institutional aid to between 95% and 100% of 
undergraduates, more than doubled the average amount of financial aid packages, and 
increased its unfunded institutional discount from 40% to 53%. The plight of Dana 
College revealed the possible consequences of a discounting spiral. 
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The lack of a significant relationship of price elasticity for either full-pay or aided 
students with unfunded institutional discounting was unexpected. Initially, it was 
hypothesized that price elasticity would differ for full-pay versus aided students, with 
aided students being more sensitive to net tuition price reflected through more elastic 
demand than full-pay students. The lack of a significant relationship between price 
elasticity and unfunded institutional aid may result from differences among the price 
elasticities for full-pay and aided students within the sample. The law of demand holds 
that an increase in price yields a decrease in quantity demanded. In other words, price 
elasticity is expected to be a negative value. In contrast, under the Chivas Regal effect 
increasing price actually yields increased demand because of the association of price with 
quality in higher education (Martin, 2011 ). 
At least 37.0% of the price elasticity values for full-pay students were greater than 
zero in any given year, indicating the presence of a Chivas Regal Effect for those 
respective colleges. At least 40.4% of the price elasticity values for aided students were 
greater than zero in any given year. These results indicate that the sample was greatly 
divided in terms of pricing power in the market. Colleges experiencing a Chi vas Regal 
effect would have been able to increase price without reducing enrollment. In contrast, 
colleges with the expected negative price elasticity values would have been unable to 
raise tuition without reducing enrollment or providing institutional aid to offset the tuition 
increase. Theoretically, these latter colleges should have increased tuition discounting to 
meet desired enrollment levels. This study's methodology did not investigate differences 
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within the sample resulting from the presence of a Chivas Regal Effect at some colleges. 
Exact conclusions are, therefore, impossible to draw in this area. 
Second, unfunded institutional discounting increased from 2000 to 2009. The 
median rate increased from 23.7% to 32.3% during the decade (see Figure 11 on p. 85). 
Between 2008 and 2009, unfunded institutional discounting jumped from a median of 
29.8% to 32.3%. This increase aligned with the dates of the economic recession, though 
no significant differences were found in the third and fourth research questions that 
focused on reactions to the recession. The nature of these questions, which examined the 
ratio of funded and unfunded discounts, did not directly look for differences in funded 
and unfunded discounts respectively. This study's approach may have overlooked 
significant changes within the individual discounting measures. 
Third, funded institutional discounts declined slightly from a median of 5.6% to 
4.7% between 2000 and 2009 (see Figure 11 on p. 85). This small change most likely 
resulted from shifts in the components of the funded institutional discount rate, which 
equals funded institutional aid divided by gross tuition and fees. As tuition increases 
outpaced growth in endowment returns and private giving, the major sources of funded 
aid, the funded institutional discount subsequently declined. The interaction of these two 
components likely explains the modest reduction in funded discount rate. 
Fourth, the percentage of full-pay students declined from 2000 to 2009 (see 
Figure 12 on p. 86). From 2000 to 2003, full-pay students increased as a percentage of 
enrolling students. After a peak of 14.8% in 2003, the median percentage dropped to 
5.4% in 2009. This drop could indicate a tipping point already passed for tuition 
discounting at private baccalaureate colleges. With fewer students willing to pay the 
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published tuition and fees, colleges must provide more tuition discounts to incentivize 
students to enroll. This decline in enrolling full-pay students signals a breakdown in the 
Robin Hood effect, through which full-pay students subsidize aided students paying less 
tuition (Allan, 1999; Hubbell & Rush, 1991). Lower levels of full-pay students reduce 
the ability of private baccalaureate colleges to subsidize aided students (Doti, 2004). 
Without the Robin Hood effect, unfunded institutional discounts increase because more 
students are receiving institutional aid. The increasing level of students provided with 
institutional aid indicates the market strength of private baccalaureate colleges overall is 
declining. 
When examined by selectivity, the sample colleges experienced different rates of 
decline in full-pay students. As shown in Table 22, all but the most selective colleges 
provided aid to more than 95% of enrolling students in 2009. The percentage of students 
receiving aid increased among each of the bottom three quartiles. These differences 
indicate the most selective institutions remain able to charge the full published tuition to a 
substantial percentage of enrolling students, whereas all other colleges must discount 
tuition in order to incentivize students to enroll. Stated simply, only the most elite 
colleges still enjoy the market strength to enroll a substantial percentage of full-pay 
students. The low levels of full-pay students among the bottom three quartiles 
demonstrate declining market strength and does not bode well for the future. Dana 
College may prove to be the first of a wave of closures or mergers as others continue 
down the discounting spiral. At some point, if it has not already happened, greater 
discounts will yield declining net revenue per student at all but the most selective 
colleges. 
117 
Table 22 
Median Percentage of Enrolling Students Receiving Institutional Aid by Admissions 
Selectivity, 2001-2009 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Q 1 (Most Selective) 57.1 53.0 57.9 59.4 58.9 54.8 57.1 56.2 56.7 
Q2 87.7 82.0 87.8 90.1 90.8 95.1 94.4 96.3 95.8 
Q3 91.6 92.1 91.7 94.9 96.5 94.7 94.0 96.2 96.1 
Q4 (Least Selective) 90.8 92.2 94.7 95.0 95.8 96.7 96.0 97.4 96.7 
Note. Admissions selectivity quartile calculated based on the admit rate for 2009. Admit 
rates for quartiles were: Q1 (8.6% to 48.9%), Q2 (49.0% to 62.3%}, Q3 (62.4% to 
72.7%}, and Q4 (72.8% to 93.5%). 
Jenny ( 1997) warned that awarding aid to more than half of students signaled a 
point of no return with aiding more than three-quarters of students becoming a self-
defeating cycle. In other words, once a college discounts to more than 75% of its 
students, the advantage of marginal cost pricing disappears and colleges must continually 
provide greater discounts to the detriment of net tuition revenue, the financial lifeblood of 
the overwhelming majority of private baccalaureate colleges. The sample colleges 
provided institutional aid to a median of 94.6% of enrolling students in 2009 with only 
the most selective colleges hovering just above 50%, Jenny's (1997) point of no return. 
With the exception of the most selective, private baccalaureate colleges may have already 
entered a self-defeating cycle in which the prevalence of institutional aid, even to 
students without demonstrated need, creates ever increasing expectations of institutional 
aid. Brown (2007) and De Vise (2011) noted that students increasingly compare 
financial aid packages in making enrollment decisions. As McPherson and Shapiro 
(1998) warned, colleges may be forced to increasingly award aid merely to keep pace 
with their competitors. Diminishing levels of full-pay students suggest the negative 
cycles that Jenny (1997) and McPherson and Shapiro (1998) foresaw may have taken 
hold at many private baccalaureate colleges. 
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From 2001 to 2009, the bottom three quartiles of private baccalaureate colleges 
provided institutional discounts at levels exceeding Jenny's (1997) markers for a point of 
no return and entering a self-defeating cycle. These levels beg the question: why have 
more colleges not closed? Bowen's (1980) revenue theory of cost offers some 
explanation. Colleges aiding greater percentages of students made due with the resulting 
net tuition revenue. As Bowen's (1980) theory suggests, a college will spend more if 
more revenue is available and spend less if less revenue is available. Another possible 
explanation for the limited closures was the for-profit sector, which purchased failing 
colleges for their accreditation (Blumenstyk, 2010). Increased scrutiny by accreditors 
and the federal government closed, or at least greatly reduced, this option (Kelderman, 
2009). Though Jenny's (1997) predictions have yet to result in massive closures, the 
circumstances are in place in which more private baccalaureate colleges may be forced to 
close or merge in coming years. 
The increasing percentage of aided students at all but the most selective colleges 
supports Breneman's (1994) use of selectivity in his composite ranking of financial 
strength. Selectivity represents the volume of potential students interested in a college by 
revealing the amount of students that can be rejected while still filling an enrolling class. 
As students apply to more colleges than in previous decades, selectivity appears to 
increase, demonstrated by declining admission rates in the sample (Hopkins, 2011; see 
Table 13 on p. 96). However, when selectivity is viewed relative to all private 
baccalaureate colleges, as in the quartiles of Table 22, it becomes clear that only the most 
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selective colleges are maintaining their market strength. Despite averaging lower 
admission rates, colleges in the bottom three quartiles demonstrated weakening markets 
that require awarding institutional aid to a higher percentage of students. 
The increasing percentage of aided students, which includes students receiving 
either need-based or merit aid, may be encouraging enrollment growth, which Breneman 
(1994) described as an expected result of discounting tuition. Enrollment at the colleges 
in the sample grew by a median of9.9% from 2000 to 2009. A fifth of the sample grew 
by 30% or more, including five colleges that more than doubled enrollment. The 
sustainability of such growth must be questioned by the individual colleges themselves. 
As Martin (2002) noted, the marginal cost pricing model inherent in discounting tuition 
only works when the capacity exists to support larger enrollments. When colleges reach 
a saturation point in terms of physical capacity, such as the number of classrooms and 
dorms, and instructional capacity, such as the number of professors and space in courses, 
the financial benefits of discounting tuition are eliminated. The substantial growth over 
the past decade suggests private baccalaureate colleges are at least approaching existing 
capacity and possibly reaching or even exceeding their physical and instructional 
capacity. 
In sum, unfunded institutional discounts increased at private baccalaureate 
colleges from 2000 to 2009. At all but the most selective colleges, more enrolling 
students receive discounted tuition, indicating the elite colleges are maintaining market 
strength in the midst of declining market strength for other colleges. In analyzing the 
ratio of funded and unfunded institutional discounts, this study's methodology may have 
overlooked significant differences in unfunded institutional discounting and funded 
120 
institutional discounting respectively. The increasing level of unfunded institutional 
discounts combined with declining levels of full-pay students may signal the presence of 
self-defeating cycles as well as a breakdown in the "Robin Hood" effect (Allan, 1999; 
Hubbell & Rush, 1991; Jenny, 1997; McPherson & Shapiro, 1998). The presence of a 
Chivas Regal effect for some colleges may have affected the outcomes of this study's 
analyses. Ultimately, given the substantial differences within the sample, a college must 
closely monitor its individual situation as Leslie and Brinkman (1987) previously 
suggested. 
Implications for Practice 
This study's results can aid practice for institutional leaders establishing tuition 
pricing and financial aid policies for a college. First, if not already doing so, practitioners 
should consider institutional data on price elasticity of enrollment demand in making 
tuition discounting decisions. Without considering information on an institution's price 
elasticity, discounting decisions are made in a vacuum. Such decisions allow discounting 
outcomes, such as reduced net tuition revenue to just happen, rather than crafting sound, 
well-reasoned institutional policy. Given the crucial nature of tuition discounting 
decisions, college leaders must be conscious of all relevant information during the 
decision making process. 
Second, practitioners should devote the foremost attention to the market strength 
of their own institution. Institutional differences, including price level, student body 
characteristics, financial aid, applicant pools, and competitors among other factors, create 
the possibility for wide variance from aggregate results (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). 
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These factors vary greatly from college to college, so each institution must determine and 
know well its niche and prospective clientele. 
A less selective college should make every effort to increase the size of its 
market. This study found these less selective colleges are most at risk from spiraling 
tuition discounts. Without sufficient endowment wealth to provide funded institutional 
aid, a less selective college must continually offer greater tuition discounts to reach its 
desired enrollment level. Continually increasing discounts eventually yield reduced net 
tuition revenue per student. Increasing market size, the volume of potential students in a 
college's market, must likely include increased admissions efforts, but the ultimate goal 
should be to define the college's niche. In other words, a less selective private 
baccalaureate college must truly know its strengths, define itself accordingly, focus on 
achievable steps supporting those strengths, and be willing to eliminate pursuits that 
distract from those core strengths (Stripling & Masterson, 2011 ). Davis & Elkins College 
in West Virginia provides a successful example of focusing on strengths under the 
leadership of President G. T. Smith. Davis & Elkins defined its small size as its foremost 
strength, focused recruiting efforts around personal contacts with prospective students, 
and found a surge in admissions after years of decline (Carlson, 2009). Other colleges 
should follow this example in expanding market size. 
This study's finding that less full-pay students enrolled at all but the most 
selective colleges suggested that a tipping point for tuition discounting may have already 
passed. Less selective colleges provided institutional aid to a greater percentage of 
enrolling students during the period of analysis. Ultimately, as Jenny (1997) and 
McPherson and Shapiro (1998) suggested, this cycle becomes self-defeating, reduces net 
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tuition revenue per student, and negatively impacts a college's financial health. Each 
college should examine its financial aid data for evidence of a tipping point in its own 
enrollment. If such a point has occurred, increasing market size to stabilize the levels of 
students receiving aid becomes all the more important. 
Third, practitioners should ensure similar characteristics and circumstances in 
establishing a peer group for comparison. Establishing a well-defined peer group for 
comparison should prove more productive in decision making than comparison to private 
baccalaureate colleges in general (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). In addition to monitoring a 
college's individual market strength, a well-defined comparison group provides valuable 
benchmarking information for the wider market. Identifying other colleges with similar 
motivations for discounting tuition is crucial, otherwise the data lacks direct applicability 
and relevance (Bowen & Breneman, 1993). The goal should be to identify a group of 
institutions with similar fmancial and market strengths against which to reference the 
college's data. 
Colleges often make comparisons to aspirational peers, institutions with targeted 
rankings or other characteristics. In discounting comparisons with aspirational peers, a 
practitioner must note that institutional motivations likely differ. Different market 
strength and discounting levels should, therefore, be expected. Such comparisons require 
a more nuanced approach to identify the specific components of financial and market 
strength a college would like to reach itself. College leaders should consider these 
components rather than setting a specific discounting target. 
Finally, practitioners in sectors beyond private baccalaureate colleges should pay 
close attention to the outcomes of tuition discounting at these colleges. Public and 
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international institutions, which increasingly practice tuition discounting themselves, 
must be aware of the possible negative implications (Baum et al., 2010; Dotterweich & 
Baryla, 2005; McPherson & Shapiro, 1995; Parrott, 2008). Private colleges were among 
the first to adopt such practices, and will be the first to show the ultimate outcomes. All 
sectors of higher education should watch the results of tuition discounting at private 
baccalaureate colleges for the implications on their own tuition and financial aid 
practices. 
In sum, practitioners should closely monitor the individual college's strength. 
Every effort should be made to increase market size at less selective institutions. Finally, 
a well-defined comparison group will provide more relevant data than comparing to all 
private baccalaureate colleges. 
A Self Critique of the Study 
As described by Leslie and Brinkman (1987), institutional differences create the 
possibility for wide variance from the aggregate results culled from the data. This 
study's sampling methodology yielded colleges with a similar educational focus, but vast 
differences in market strength and endowment wealth. These differences within the 
sample likely affected the outcome of statistical analyses. As this study found, 
discounting differed by admissions selectivity, an indicator of market size. In hindsight, 
stratifying the sample based on financial strength indicators, including selectivity and the 
variables used by Breneman (1994), might have yielded different results though the 
volatility of the price elasticity measures used was extreme in a number of cases. 
Second, calculating price elasticities for only enrolling students likely exaggerated 
the resulting values (Leslie & Brinkman, 1987). Bryan and Whipple (1995) 
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demonstrated lower price responsiveness among currently enrolled students. This study 
used price elasticity of enrolling students based upon the available data. This choice 
likely inflated the calculated price elasticity values. Incorporating the entire enrollment 
would provide a more accurate value of overall price elasticity for a college, though this 
data is not readily available. 
Third, the high levels of colleges with price elasticities greater than zero, 
indicating the presence of a Chi vas Regal effect, may indicate two overlapping groups 
within this study's sample. The pricing power of colleges experiencing a Chivas Regal 
effect differs greatly from those operating with negative price elasticities as expected 
under the law of demand. A total of34 colleges, or 23.4% of the sample, yielded average 
price elasticities greater than zero for both full-pay and aided students during the period 
of analysis. More than half of the colleges had an average price elasticity greater than 
zero for either full-pay or aided students. These colleges enjoyed greater pricing power 
from a Chivas Regal effect. If this study's sample includes overlapping groups, it would 
affect the outcome of statistical analyses. Price elasticity itself could be used to ensure 
analyses include colleges with similar motivations for discounting tuition. Colleges 
operating with a Chivas Regal effect would be expected to provide lower levels of 
unfunded institutional discount based upon increasing price yielding increased demand. 
Fourth, the first and second questions considered the relationship of price 
elasticity to unfunded institutional discounting in the same year. This methodology 
ignores the possibility of a lag effect in which unfunded institutional aid responds to 
changes in price elasticity from the previous year, or years, instead of the current year. 
Since administrators would not know price elasticity for the current year at the time 
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tuition and financial aid decisions were made, it is plausible these decisions are made 
based on enrollment trends from prior years. Hemelt and Marcotte (20 II) incorporated a 
lag effect in a study of student price response at public institutions, though these variables 
did not prove significant. Nevertheless, a lag effect seems reasonable given the 
information available to decision makers at private baccalaureate colleges when making 
tuition discounting decisions. 
Finally, as previously described, this study considered the relationship of funded 
and unfunded institutional aid together, rather than examining changes to funded and 
unfunded discounting individually. Examining the separate rates may have yielded 
different outcomes in the third and fourth questions. 
Recommendations for Further Research 
Given the outcomes of this study's analyses, the recommendations for further 
research involve refming methodology for examining tuition discounting at private 
baccalaureate colleges. 
First, future research should examine the tiered differences in tuition discounting 
found in this study. As shown in Table 22, the percentage of students receiving 
institutional aid differed greatly between the most selective quartile and the remaining 
75% of the sample. A future study should analyze differences in tuition discounting 
within a stratified sample. Breneman (1994) used a composite ranking of financial 
strength based on three variables: endowment per FTE, net tuition per FTE, and 
admissions selectivity. Future research should incorporate similar methodology in 
examining tuition discounting. 
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Second, future research should examine changes in funded and unfunded 
institutional discounting individually. As previously discussed, examining the ratio of 
these two variables as done in this study may have masked significant changes in either 
variable. Based on the descriptive data demonstrating an increase in unfunded 
discounting, examining this variable in isolation may reveal the incremental changes 
between years resulted in significant change over time. 
Third, given the possibility of a lag effect between available information and 
decision making, future research should investigate the relationship of tuition discounting 
decisions to the enrollment response of the prior year or years. This methodology is more 
likely to mirror the information applied by administrators at the time tuition pricing and 
financial aid decisions are made. 
Conclusion 
This study found no statistically significant relationship of price elasticity for 
either full-pay or aided students to unfunded institutional discounting. Admissions 
selectivity was a significant predictor of unfunded institutional discounting with less 
selective institutions providing larger unfunded discounts. This relationship supported 
the conclusion that colleges awarding higher levels of unfunded aid have less market 
strength. No significant changes were found in the ratio of funded and unfunded 
institutional discounts as a result of the recession from 2007 to 2009. 
As a result of this study, practitioners should focus on a college's individual 
characteristics and circumstances rather than aggregate data in monitoring tuition 
discounting levels. The substantial variance, even among colleges with a similar 
undergraduate focus, allows for vastly different outcomes in individual institutions. 
Practitioners should consider institutional motivation for discounting tuition when 
establishing a peer group, ensuring comparison to other colleges of similar 
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circumstances. College leaders should think strategically about the distinct components 
of financial and market strength, such as endowment size, net tuition per student, or 
admissions selectivity, in setting goals for an institution rather than establishing a specific 
discounting target. 
Future research in this area should consider examining a stratified sample based 
on financial or market strength, incorporating the possibility of a lag effect, and 
examining the rates of funded and unfunded institutional discounting individually. 
In conclusion, lower selectivity is significantly associated with higher tuition 
discounting. Beyond the most selective quartile, private baccalaureate colleges awarded 
institutional aid to the overwhelming majority of enrolling students. With three-quarters 
of colleges awarding institutional aid to more than 95% of enrolling students in 2009, a 
tipping point may have already passed for tuition discounting at these colleges, which 
could signal a downward spiral like that of Dana College for many other institutions. 
Less selective colleges must make every effort to expand their market size, or ultimately 
risk closure if a sufficient niche cannot be found to bolster admissions. In regard to 
funded and unfunded institutional aid, a change did occur alongside the economic 
recession from 2007 to 2009. The limited window of this study prohibits firm 
conclusions, but the sharp increase in unfunded discounting must be monitored closely. 
As data beyond 2009 becomes available, research can determine if this shift represented a 
continuing trend, or merely a temporary reaction to the economy. If truly a shift, the 
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uptick in unfunded discounting may indicate a number of private baccalaureate colleges 
have begun spiraling downward in a precarious discounting cycle. 
Appendix A 
Table A1 
List of Colleges Included in the Study Sample 
Unit Institution Name 
ID 
168528 Adrian College 
168546 Albion College 
156189 Alice Lloyd College 
210669 Allegheny College 
217624 Allen University 
168591 Alma College 
164465 Amherst College 
143084 Augustana College 
189097 Barnard College 
197911 Barton College 
197984 Belmont Abbey College 
238333 Beloit College 
197993 Bennett College for Women 
154721 Bethany College 
23 7181 Bethany College 
154749 Bethel College 
143288 Blackburn College 
183822 Bloomfield College 
231554 Bluefield College 
161004 Bowdoin College 
231581 Bridgewater College 
230825 Burlington College 
173258 Carleton College 
180106 Carroll College 
15 3108 Central College 
156408 Centre College 
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State 
Michigan 
Michigan 
Kentucky 
Pennsylvania 
South Carolina 
Michigan 
Massachusetts 
Illinois 
New York 
North Carolina 
North Carolina 
Wisconsin 
North Carolina 
Kansas 
West Virginia 
Kansas 
Illinois 
New Jersey 
Virginia 
Maine 
Virginia 
Vermont 
Minnesota 
Montana 
Iowa 
Kentucky 
130 
Unit Institution Name State 
ID 
198303 Chowan University North Carolina 
217907 Coker College South Carolina 
182634 Colby-Sawyer College New Hampshire 
174747 College of Saint Benedict Minnesota 
166124 College of the Holy Cross Massachusetts 
178697 College of the Ozarks Missouri 
190248 Concordia College-New York New York 
153162 Cornell College Iowa 
177144 Culver-Stockton College Missouri 
198385 Davidson College North Carolina 
202523 Denison University Ohio 
150400 DePauw University Indiana 
212009 Dickinson College Pennsylvania 
158802 Dillard University Louisiana 
224527 East Texas Baptist University Texas 
133492 Eckerd College Florida 
232089 Ferrum College Virginia 
133711 Flagler College Florida 
212577 Franklin and Marshall College Pennsylvania 
150604 Franklin College Indiana 
212674 Gettysburg College Pennsylvania 
153384 Grinnell College Iowa 
198613 Guilford College North Carolina 
173647 Gustavus Adolphus College Minnesota 
191515 Hamilton College New York 
232256 Hampden-Sydney College Virginia 
166018 Hampshire College Massachusetts 
150756 Hanover College Indiana 
191533 Hartwick College New York 
115409 Harvey Mudd College California 
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Unit Institution Name State 
ID 
212911 Haverford College Pennsylvania 
191621 Hilbert College New York 
101435 Huntingdon College Alabama 
145691 Illinois College Illinois 
153621 Iowa Wesleyan College Iowa 
200156 Jamestown College North Dakota 
225885 Jarvis Christian College Texas 
198756 Johnson C. Smith University North Carolina 
101541 Judson College Alabama 
213251 Juniata College Pennsylvania 
170532 Kalamazoo College Michigan 
157076 Kentucky Wesleyan College Kentucky 
203535 Kenyon College Ohio 
146427 Knox College Illinois 
213385 Lafayette College Pennsylvania 
220589 Lambuth University Tennessee 
220598 Lane College Tennessee 
239017 Lawrence University Wisconsin 
220604 Le Moyne-Owen College Tennessee 
198808 Lees-McRae College North Carolina 
218238 Limestone College South Carolina 
209065 Linfield College Oregon 
198862 Livingstone College North Carolina 
153834 Luther College Iowa 
213668 Lycoming College Pennsylvania 
173902 Macalester College Minnesota 
146825 MacMurray College Illinois 
151777 Manchester College Indiana 
230940 Marlboro College Vermont 
192864 Marymount Manhattan College New York 
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Unit Institution Name State 
ID 
220710 Maryville College Tennessee 
226587 McMurry University Texas 
155511 McPherson College Kansas 
101675 Miles College Alabama 
178369 Missouri Valley College Missouri 
147341 Monmouth College Illinois 
140553 Morehouse College Georgia 
218399 Morris College South Carolina 
199069 Mount Olive College North Carolina 
214175 Muhlenberg College Pennsylvania 
218414 Newberry College South Carolina 
199209 North Carolina Wesleyan College North Carolina 
154101 Northwestern College Iowa 
204909 Ohio Wesleyan University Ohio 
107512 Ouachita Baptist University Arkansas 
140720 Paine College Georgia 
121257 Pitzer College California 
121345 Pomona College California 
218539 Presbyterian College South Carolina 
233295 Randolph-Macon College Virginia 
239628 Ripon College Wisconsin 
233426 Roanoke College Virginia 
176318 Rust College Mississippi 
183239 Saint Anselm College New Hampshire 
152390 Saint Mary's College Indiana 
233499 Saint Pauls College Virginia 
148849 Shimer College Illinois 
140988 Shorter University Georgia 
231086 Southern Vermont College Vermont 
141060 Spelman College Georgia 
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ID 
199698 St. Andrews Presbyterian College North Carolina 
174844 St. OlafCollege Minnesota 
155937 Sterling College Kansas 
216278 Susquehanna University Pennsylvania 
216287 Swarthmore College Pennsylvania 
206589 The College of Wooster Ohio 
216357 Thiel College Pennsylvania 
124292 Thomas Aquinas College California 
141185 Toccoa Falls College Georgia 
157818 Transylvania University Kentucky 
149505 Trinity Christian College Illinois 
196866 Union College New York 
161572 Unity College Maine 
107558 University of the Ozarks Arkansas 
216524 Ursinus College Pennsylvania 
233912 Virginia Intermont College Virginia 
234173 Virginia Wesleyan College Virginia 
218919 Voorhees College South Carolina 
152673 Wabash College Indiana 
154527 Wartburg College Iowa 
216667 Washington & Jefferson College Pennsylvania 
197230 Wells College New York 
179946 Westminster College Missouri 
168281 Wheaton College Massachusetts 
237057 Whitman College Washington 
179955 William Jewell College Missouri 
107877 Williams Baptist College Arkansas 
240338 Wisconsin Lutheran College Wisconsin 
218973 Wofford College South Carolina 
181853 York College Nebraska 
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Table A2 
List of Colleges Removed from the Study Sample and Reason(s)for Removal 
Unit ID Institution Name 
217624 Allen University 
160977 Bates College 
384254 Beacon College 
217721 Benedict College 
156295 Berea College 
139205 Brewton-Parker College 
Reason(s) 
Reported $0 in unfunded instutional aid for 
2000, 2001, and 2003. 
No tuition and/or fees reported in 2000, 2001, 
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and 
2009. Bates College charges a comprehensive 
fee, so separate charges for tuition, fees, room 
and board, etc. cannot be determined. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and 
2009. Missing data for unfunded institutional 
aid in 2001 and 2002. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000,2001, 2002, and 2003. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006, 
2007, 2008, and 2009. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007, 
2008, and 2009. 
230047 Brigham Young University- A subsidiary branch of a parent institution. 
Hawaii 
176947 Central Methodist University- A subsidiary branch of a parent institution. 
College of Liberal Arts & 
Sciences 
112394 Cogswell Polytechnical 
College 
161086 Colby College 
237358 Davis & Elkins College 
133526 Edward Waters College 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2006, 2007, and 2008. Missing data for 
unfunded institutional aid in 2000, 2001, 2002, 
2003, 2004, and 2005. 
No tuition and/or fees reported in 2000, 2001, 
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and 
2009. Colby College charges a comprehensive 
fee, so separate charges for tuition, fees, room 
and board, etc. cannot be determined. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000, 2001,2002, and 2003. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000,2001,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and 
Unit ID Institution Name Reason(s) 
2009. 
139630 Emmanuel College Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000, 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
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144971 Eureka College Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2003,2004, 2005,2006,2007, 2008, and 2009. 
212805 Grove City College Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2009. Reported $1 in unfunded institutional aid 
for 2003. Missing data for unfunded 
institutional aid in 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 
2006, 2007, and 2008. 
170301 Hope College Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006, 
2007, 2008, and 2009. 
145646 Illinois Wesleyan University Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2009. 
135063 Jones College-Jacksonville Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006, 
2007, 2008, and 2009. 
106342 Lyon College Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,and 
2007. 
198899 Mars Hill College 
220701 Martin Methodist College 
155627 Ottawa University 
107600 Philander Smith College 
148016 Principia College 
199582 Saint Augustines College 
228343 Southwestern University 
102270 Stillman College 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000, 2001, and 2002. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2005, 2006, and 2007. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2005,2006, 2007,2008, and 2009. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006, 
2007, 2008, and 2009. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,and2008. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000, 2001, and 2002. 
Unit ID Institution Name 
102298 Talladega College 
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Reason(s) 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and 
2009. 
221731 Tennessee Wesleyan College Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004. 
228981 Texas Lutheran University 
176406 Tougaloo College 
168218 Wellesley College 
229887 Wiley College 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,and 
2007. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2002,2003,2004,2005,2006,2007,2008,and 
2009. 
Reported $0 in unfunded institutional aid for 
2000, 2003, 2004, 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
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